Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating Shareholder Wealth? by Oesterle, Dale A. & Norberg, Jon R.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 41 
Issue 2 Issue 2 - March 1988 Article 1 
3-1988 
Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating Shareholder 
Wealth? 
Dale A. Oesterle 
Jon R. Norberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dale A. Oesterle and Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating Shareholder 
Wealth?, 41 Vanderbilt Law Review 207 (1988) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol41/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 41 MARCH 1988 NUMBER 2
Management Buyouts: Creating or
Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?
Dale Arthur Oesterle* and Jon R. Norberg**
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................... 208
II. MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS ................................. 215
A. The Environment and Mechanics of Management
B uyouts ....................................... 215
B. The Potential for Abuse ........................ 218
C. Explaining the Premium Price in Management
B uyouts ....................................... 222
III. COURT REGULATION OF MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS ......... 234
A. Removing Barriers to Price Competition ......... 236
B. The Independent Negotiating Committee ........ 241
C. The Management Buyout Group's Obligation to
Disclose its Reservation Price ................... 244
IV. BETTER METHODS OF PROTECTING TARGET SHAREHOLDERS 249
A. Increasing the Accountability of Investment Advi-
sors ........................................... 249
B. Strengthening the Independent Negotiating Com-
mittee Versus Requiring More Disclosure by the
Buyout Group ................................. 255
V. CONCLUSION ............................................ 259
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
** Member, Minnesota Bar.
208 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:207
I. INTRODUCTION
The name of the game in corporate America today is leverage.
Whether through leveraged buyouts' or leveraged recapitalizations,2
many of the United States' largest corporations are rapidly trading eq-
uity capital for debt.' This trend began only a few years ago when a
1. "Leveraged buyout" (LBO) denominates a variety of corporate acquisition transactions in
which the purchase of the target company is financed through a large increase in debt, which
sometimes raises the debt-to-equity ratio by several hundred percent to as high as ten to one or
more. In a "management buyout" (MBO), a species of the LBO, a small group of investors, includ-
ing members of the target corporation's existing management, purchase the publicly held shares of
the corporation, often through a tender offer, which allows the company to cease public reporting
under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requirements. The debt incurred in the
purchase is retired with the sale of assets, the cash flow from earnings of the now private company,
or both. See infra text accompanying notes 37-49.
2. A leveraged recapitalization also involves a substitution of debt for equity in the corpora-
tion's capital structure, often with a large, one-time cash payout to shareholders. Leveraged recapi-
talizations may be undertaken in response to hostile overtures from a third party or as a
prophylactic defense. See Cowan, The New Way to Halt Raiders, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1987, at
D1, col. 3. In either case, the goal is to increase "shareholder value" through the cash payout and a
restructuring of assets and the corporate financial structure, while simultaneously discouraging
hostile bidders who no longer can borrow against the target's heavily leveraged assets. The restruc-
turing portion of the transaction will usually include divestiture of assets or entire lines of busi-
ness. See Gogel, Corporate Restructuring, MGMT. REV., July 1987, at 28, 30. The difference
between an LBO and a leveraged recapitalization is that in the latter the target's existing share-
holders continue in their ownership capacity through the issuance of new "stub" shares that re-
present a roughly proportionate ownership interest in the newly capitalized company. The stock
market generally has looked favorably upon such leveraged recapitalizations. Jensen, Agency Costs
of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 325 (1986); Smith,
Leveraged Recapitalization Plans, BUYOUTS & ACQUISITIONS, July-Aug. 1987, at 13, 16. Professor
Oliver Williamson explains the price increase by noting that debt financing is an efficient method
of reducing the agency costs of some firms, specifically those firms that have a high ratio of
redeployable to nonredeployable physical assets. See Williamson, Mergers, Acquisitions, and
Leveraged Buyouts: An Efficiency Assessment, Discussion Paper No. 28, Law and Economics Pro-
gram, Harvard Law School (Apr. 1987); see also Grossman & Hart, Corporate Financial Structure
and Managerial Incentives, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY (J. McCall ed.
1982) (indicating that debt more effectively bonds managers' incentives to shareholders' interests).
3. Pozdena, Takeovers and Junk Bonds, BUYOUTS & ACQUISITIONS, July-Aug. 1987, at 49; see
also Labich, Is Business Taking on Too Much Debt?, FORTUNE, July 22, 1985, at 82.
The increased use of leverage is, in part, attributable to a changing risk/reward profile for
several classes of investors. Banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and other institutional
investors have increased their willingness to take positions in more highly leveraged firms because
deregulation has permitted new forms of investment and low demand by traditional borrowers has
increased the search for high-yield lending opportunities. The markets for corporate debt have also
seen a dramatic increase in efficiency with much greater liquidity for and more accurate pricing of
low quality, high-yield corporate bonds. See Gogel, supra note 2, at 31. Noninvestment grade,
high-yield bonds now account for as much as 20% of all bonds outstanding, as compared with less
than 10% a decade ago. Selby, Learning to Like Leverage, INST. INVESTOR, Dec. 1986, at 118, 119.
Increased leverage is also a function of the equity repurchase programs undertaken by several
major corporations. As common stock is repurchased and removed from the balance sheet, the
leverage of the company increases just as surely as with the issuance of new debt. Id. at 125 (re-
porting that corporate acquisitions and equity repurchase programs have retired $220 billion in
equity capital of American corporations in the last four years).
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small group of financial entrepreneurs, which included Carl Icahn,4 T.
Boone Pickens,5 Asher Edelman,' Irwin Jacobs,7 and Ronald Perelman,"
found that they could finance large stock purchases of major corpora-
tions through the use of high-yield ("junk") bonds' leading to either an
acquisition of the target or its forced restructuring. The general goal of
these financiers was to force a reconciliation between what they per-
ceived as low stock prices and corporate assets of far greater potential
value.10 Their efforts have been tremendously profitable.
The corporate targets of these hostile share acquisitions, however,
did not sit idly by and wait to have their shares gobbled up. The de-
fenses they erected are now. famous because of their frequent use and
colorful names: the "Pac-Man" defense, the "scorched earth" defense,
"shark repellents" and "poison pills."'11 While these defenses proved to
4. See, e.g., Leinster, Carl Icahn's Calculated Bets, FORTUNE, Mar. 18, 1985, at 142; Scherer,
Just Who is Carl Icahn and What Does He Want?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 8, 1985, at 52;
Carley, USX Might Face TWA-Style Shake-Up Under Icahn, Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1986, at 6, col.
1.
5. See, e.g., High Times for T. Boone Pickens, TIME, Mar. 4, 1985, at 52; Potts, Raider vs.
Corporate Executive, Wash. Post, Sept. 17, 1987, at El, col. 3.
6. See, e.g., Williams & Cohen, Newest Kid on the Takeover Block, BARRON'S, Mar. 11,
1985, at 8, col. 1; Offer is Begun for Burlington Industries, Wall St. J., May 6, 1987, at 3, col. 4.
7. See, e.g., Irwin Jacobs Is Getting Ready to Pounce Again, Bus. WK., June 4, 1986, at 36;
Ross, Irwin Jacobs Lands a Big One-Finally, FORTUNE, July 8, 1985, at 130.
8. See, e.g., Big Investors on Wall Street, FORTUNE, Oct. 26, 1987, at 8; How the 12 Top
Raiders Rate, FORTUNE, Sept. 28, 1987, at 44; Possible Revlon Buyout May Be Sign of a Bigger
Perelman Move in Works, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1987, at 16, col. 1.
9. These bonds are simply debt securities rated below investment grade by the major rating
services, Standard & Poor's and Moody's. See Pozdena, supra note 3.
10. In several recent contests for corporate control, financial analysts' estimates of the
"break-up value" of the target corporation have greatly exceeded the target's stock price prior to
the bid. For an extreme example of this, see Putting a Value on CBS Assets, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22,
1985, at D6, col. 3 (noting that in Ted Turner's bid for control of CBS the market estimated the
break-up value of CBS at two to three times its stock price); see also Minstar's Jacobs to Sell
AMF Businesses; Most of Corporate Staff Has Been Fired, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1985, at 5, col. 2.
For an explanation of how these differences between asset values and stock prices might arise, see
Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in The Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 31-
35 (1986) (arguing that risk-averse managers who hold strong preferences for earnings retention
and growth have caused many corporations to expand beyond their optimal size); see also infra
note 49; cf. The Restructuring Wave: A New Fact of Life, BuYouTs & ACQUISITIONS, July-Aug.
1987, at 23, reprinted from MGMT. PRAC. Q., Winter-Spring 1987.
11. The body of literature arguing the pros and cons of these and various other takeover
defenses is enormous. See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1377 (1986); Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Merg-
ers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 341; Easterbrook &
Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L.
REV. 1161 (1981); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Matheson & Norberg, Hostile Share Acqui-
sitions and Corporate Governance: A Framework for Evaluating Antitakeover Activities, 47 U.
PIrr. L. REV. 407 (1986); Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Dela-
ware Supreme Court, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 117 (1986) [hereinafter Oesterle I]; Oesterle, Target
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be an initial deterrent to hostile acquisitions, more creative financing
techniques and other offensive weapons have rendered these defenses
something of a Maginot Line.12 Target managements, searching for a
way to protect their shareholders, their jobs, or both, increasingly have
taken the approach of fighting fire with fire-that is, using leverage and
redeployment of assets in an attempt to create for themselves the same
profits sought by the hostile bidder.
The present-day management buyout developed primarily as a de-
fensive response to the attacks of the financial entrepreneurs and other
acquisition hungry companies. Top executives who became the equity
holders in the private companies that followed buyouts generally have
found this new defense as enormously profitable as the comparable of-
fensive purchases of the financiers who initiated the first round of lever-
aged stock acquisitions.13 Likewise, the leveraged recapitalization can
be viewed largely as management's attempt to effect the same reconcili-
ation of values between stock prices and corporate assets by which a
hostile bidder seeks to profit,14 while keeping the company independent
with ownership continuing in the hands of the public shareholders.
Here too, however, management will often grab a slice of the equity pie
as an "incentive booster" in the course of revamping the corporation's
capital structure. It appears that like buyouts, top executives find the
leveraged recapitalization quite profitable. 5
Many buyouts have been so successful that rather than being seen
primarily as a defensive response to a hostile tender offer, 6 manage-
ment or specialty firms such as Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co.7 and
Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Pas-
sivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53 (1985) [hereinafter Oesterle II].
12. For examples of recent failed takeover defenses, see, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798
F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1986); Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Minstar
Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Asarco, Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A
Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Goldsmith, 609 F. Supp. 187
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986);
see also Life Becomes Easier For Corporate Raiders, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1986, at 6, col. 1. But see
GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum, Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
13. See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
14. See Cowan, supra note 2, at D4; Smith, supra note 2, at 14.
15. See Cowan, supra note 2, at D4.
16. Although a third-party offer may not exist at the time a buyout is initiated, all such
transactions are carried out with very careful consideration of the firm's status as a potential target
in the market for corporate control.
17. See Leveraged Buy-Outs Are Facing Downturn After Crash, Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1987, at
6, col. 1 (reporting that Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts had raised a $5 billion fund for use in financing
leveraged buyouts); King of the Buyouts, Kohlberg Kravis Helps Alter Corporate U.S., Wall St. J.,
Apr. 11, 1986, at 1, col. 6; Kohlberg Kravis to Get $45 Million Fee If Its Purchase of Beatrice Is
Completed, Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1986, at 4, col. 1 [hereinafter Kohlberg Kravis Fee]; Kohlberg
[Vol. 41:207
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Forstmann Little & Co. 8 will initiate a buyout to capitalize on their
belief that the target firm's stock price does not reflect its intrinsic
value. Management thus approaches such an opportunity from nearly
the same perspective as an outside bidder.
Equally important as management's role in the leveraging of the
modern corporation is the role of the investment banks. Management
buyouts, particularly in response to a hostile bid, are a bonanza for in-
vestment banking firms. Managers entangled in tender offers turn to
investment advisors for price evaluations and assistance in securing fi-
nancing, issuing new securities, structuring bids, and mounting de-
fenses.' 9 The investment bankers play an important role when they give
honest advice based on their special financial expertise. Too often,
however, it appears that managers are not buying the services of open-
minded experts, but rather are buying made-to-order recommendations,
usually in the form of written "fairness opinions" that support manag-
ers' pre-established positions.20 This practice is harmless when manag-
ers are intent on acting consistently with their shareholders' best
interests.2' But when managers' interests and shareholders' interests
diverge, as they often do in the case of tender offers, this mercenary
cooperation between investment advisors and managers may produce
Kravis Bids $4.91 Billion, Or $45 a Share, for Beatrice Cos., Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
18. See Forstmann Little Sets $2.7 Billion Fund for Buyouts, Wall St. J., May 28, 1987, at
22, col. 2; Dannen, LBOs: How Long Can This Go On?, INST. INVESTOR, Nov. 1986, at 151, 154
(noting that a Forstmann Little buyout fund had earned an average annual return of 32.7% on
subordinated debt and 95.2% on its equity investments).
19. Indeed, the investment advisors often seek out the managers, alerting bidders to attrac-
tive purchasing opportunities and alerting potential targets to rumors of bids in the offing. Some
critics contend that much of the recent surge in merger and acquisition activity is attributable to
feeseeking investment bankers fomenting takeovers for any company for which financing can be
arranged. See Investment Bankers Feed a Merger Boom and Pick Up Fat Fees, Wall St. J., Apr.
2, 1986, at 1, col. 6; see also J. BROOKS, THE TAKEOVER GAME (1987); cf. infra note 23 and accompa-
nying text.
20. See, e.g., Plaza Secs. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1535, 1537 (E.D. Mich.), afl'd
sub nom. Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (describing situation in which
investment banking firm suggested buyout price of approximately $50 per share, while manage-
ment wished to participate only at a price of $48 to $48.50 per share; buyout offer made at the
lower management price without disclosure of investment bank's suggested price); see also Rabkin
v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Del. 1985). Some commentators have gone
much further than the courts in suggesting that fairness opinions are simply a form of "deceit
upon the investing public and upon the marketplace generally." Stein, Investment Banking's
Dirty Little Secret, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, § 3, at 2, col. 3; see also McGough, Fairness for
Hire, FORBES, July 29, 1985, at 52; Wander, Special Problems of Acquisition Disclosure: Invest-
ment Bankers' Reports and Conflicts of Interest, 7 INST. ON SEc. REG. 157, 158 (1976) (discussing
the role of fairness opinions in influencing shareholder ratification of transactions).
21. Managers who completely give up the opportunity to obtain good outside advice increase
their risk of error. But most managers who use made-to-order fairness opinions will informally
seek outside advice. When a satisfactory agreement is negotiated, including limitations upon the
scope of the opinion, the formal fairness opinion will then be presented to the shareholders.
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only window dressing: managers dress up their positions with valuations
by ostensibly fair-minded experts in order to hoodwink their
shareholders.2
A hostile bid is invariably a threat to management's future employ-
ment. Managers may respond to such a threat by using fairness
opinions to convince their shareholders to refuse to tender their shares.
Alternatively, managers may use an opinion that the hostile bid is
"grossly inadequate" to forestall the recriminations of angry sharehold-
ers when defensive programs-poison pill plans, litigation, or manage-
ment buyout proposals, for example-are implemented causing stock
prices to decline. On the other hand, when a bidder offers managers
lucrative employment contracts or severance contracts contingent on
the success of the tender offer, managers can use fairness opinions to
convince their shareholders to tender their shares. The potential for
abuse of fairness opinions is the most severe in management buyouts
because the managers are the purchasers of the public's stock and have
a direct stake in convincing their own shareholders to sell cheaply.
While it is becoming increasingly rare for investment advisors who de-
clare that the price offered by the buyout group is fair to also be equity
participants in the buyout, firms rendering opinions still may be financ-
ing substantial amounts of debt for the acquisition. 3 Moreover, even
22. Potential managerial misuse of fairness opinions varies with the context of a tender offer
or buyout. The phenomenon is encountered most frequently in the defense of target corporations
countering hostile offers. Target management almost invariably will obtain a statement from its
financial advisors claiming that the offered price is "grossly inadequate," even though the offer
exceeds the market price by 25% or more. While some offers carrying substantial premiums over
market price may not reflect the absolute maximum justifiable purchase price, many of these offers
are not "grossly inadequate." In the struggle for control of Fruehauf Corporation, for example, the
target directors promptly rejected a suitor's offers of $41 and $42 per share simply on the oral
advice of their investment bankers, even though the stock was trading in the mid-$20 range. Plaza
Securities, 643 F. Supp at 1537; see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d
173, 177 (Del. 1986); Gillette's Board Refuses Revlon's $47-a-Share Bid, Wall St. J., Aug. 25, 1987,
at 4, col. 1.
23. In addition to a possible equity stake in leveraged buyouts, investment banking firms will
provide large, short-term loans to their clients to facilitate tender offers or major open market
purchases. These loans are known as "bridge loans" because they provide a temporary bridge until
longer term financing can be obtained. The investment banks, while taking significant risk, have
profited handsomely from these transactions. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch Leads Wall Street's Buy-
Out Business, Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1987, at 6, col. 1 [hereinafter Merrill Lynch]; Deep-Pocketed
Deal Makers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1987, at D1, col. 1; Owens-Illinois, in Going Private, Limits
Right Of Junior Bondholders to Get Money Back, Wall St. J., June 9, 1987, at 69, col. 3 (stating
that Morgan Stanley earned an annualized 80% before taxes on its $300 million bridge loan to
finance the buyout of Owens-Illinois); Wall Street Deal Makers Take More Risk, Wall St. J., Nov.
6, 1986, at 6, col. 1; see also Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 884-85 (6th Cir. 1986)
(describing situation in which a buyout proposal included loans totaling $750 million from invest-
ment bank and commercial bank, $100 million stock repurchase by target, $10 to $15 million eq-
uity contribution from management participants, and $10 to $15 million equity from investment
bank).
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investment banking firms that are not involved in the financing may be
acting under a fee arrangement that conditions payment on the success
of the buyout; this inevitably clouds the objectivity of their advice to
shareholders.24
Management buyouts are most notorious when shareholders sell a
languishing firm to their own managers and then watch their former
managers rejuvenate the firm and profit handsomely. The ex-sharehold-
ers develop a natural skepticism about the fidelity of their former fidu-
ciaries.25 After buyouts, target firm executives have earned staggering,
immediate profits either through private resale of the assets of the firm
or through something known as a "round trip," which involves restruc-
turing the company before taking it public a short time later.26 John
Kluge, for example, took Metromedia private in 1984 and has already
raised five times the purchase price through partial liquidation, giving
him a personal profit of close to three billion dollars.2 7 John Pomerantz
took Leslie Fay private in 1982 for 58 million dollars. He then resold
the company to the public in 1986 for 360 million dollars. In four years
Mr. Pomerantz made an estimated 60 million dollars on an equity in-
24. For a description of these types of problems, see Stein, Loss of Values: Did the Amsted
LBO Shortchange Shareholders?, BARRON's, Feb. 16, 1987, at 8; Heineman, How to Avoid Conflicts
of Interest in the Takeover Game, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1987, at 18, col. 3.
25. See Stein, supra note 24; Hector, Are Shareholders Cheated By LBOs?, FORTUNE, Jan.
19, 1987, at 98. Shareholders also may find that the buyout has been timed very opportunistically
in order to allow management to buy the company at historically low prices. While this is a natural
time for management to contemplate a buyout, it does give public shareholders good reason to
question management's recent efforts on their behalf. See Crazy Eddie Inc. Report Discloses an
SEC Inquiry, Wall St. J., June 18, 1987, at 4, col. 1 [hereinafter Crazy Eddie] (describing a situa-
tion in which a corporate founder proposed a buyout after selling millions of dollars of stock at
higher price and stimulating market decline in stock through his withdrawal from the firm).
26. The time frame for most companies that are targets of buyouts to be brought public
again or sold to new owners seems to be about five years, with some recent MBOs returning to the
public equity markets in only about a year. See Beatrice Buy-Out May Net Investors Eightfold
Return, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 1987, at 5, col. 1 [hereinafter Beatrice Buy-Out]; Many Firms Go
Public Within a Few Years Of Leveraged Buyout, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1987, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter
Round Trips]; Wall St. Buys Into the Action, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1986, at D1, col. 3. As invest-
ment banks commit larger amounts of their own capital to buyouts, we may expect to see even
more pressure to return companies to public ownership so that the large equity investors can real-
ize gains and recover needed capital. See also Ferenbach, The IPO Market Welcome for LBOs in
Transition, MERGERS & AcQUISmONs, Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 54 (discussing the market for re-offering
private company shares to the public to complete the buyout transaction's life cycle); Miller,
LBOs: Now It's Time to Cash In, INST. INVESTOR, July 1986, at 139; Dannen, supra note 18, at 158
(quoting Henry Kravis, of Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., on why companies are quickly sold or
taken public again: "The longer you hold [an LBO investment], the more your returns will
decline").
27. Hector, supra note 25, at 99; see also Metromedia Inc.'s Holders Approve $1.13 Billion
Buyout, Wall St. J., June 21, 1984, at 20, col. 3; Sloan, Metromedia Revisited, FORBES, Dec. 19,
1984, at 32.
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vestment of one million dollars.2" There are numerous other examples:
of the thirty companies that went private after 1981 and subsequently
were resold before the end of 1986, the average increase in value for the
purchasing group was 150 percent.29
The enormous profitability of buyouts that often seem little more
than a reshuffling of corporate assets and paper by managers raises seri-
ous questions for shareholders. Managers are on both the buy and sell
sides of the buyout and face obvious conflicts of interest. Shareholders
must question whether the managers, fiduciaries who were charged with
protecting and furthering shareholders' interests, have not in fact
picked their pockets or the pockets of other corporate constituencies.30
Likewise, the chicanery of using made-to-order fairness opinions is
probably widespread and will continue to be so unless investment advi-
sors are more accountable to the shareholders, who are the true pur-
chasers of their advice.3 l
This Article calls for a re-evaluation of the legal obligations of
management buyout participants and investment bankers to sharehold-
ers and proposes procedural guidelines by which to govern the interre-
lationships of these parties in buyouts and, by implication, in all tender
offers. Part II of this Article describes management buyouts and the
role of investment bankers. Part III examines the problems courts face
in resolving pricing disputes in management buyouts. The Article con-
cludes with suggestions for strengthening the procedural safeguards af-
forded shareholders and for increasing the accountability of managers,
directors, and independent investment advisors.
28. Hector, supra note 25, at 99.
29. Id. at 104; see also Merrill Lynch, supra note 23 (reporting that Merrill and its partners
sold Denny's Inc. for $220 million, more than quadruple its $45 million equity investment made
only slightly more than two years earlier; and Merrill also sold Signode Corp. for $278 million after
purchasing the company with an equity investment of $27.5 million four years previous); Fer-
enbach, supra note 26, at 54, 56. But see Loomis, LBOs Are Taking Their Lumps, FORTUNE, Dec.
7, 1987, at 64 (describing the financing troubles many LBOs are facing in the wake of the October
19, 1987 stock market crash).
30. Professor John Coffee has shown that some of the profits from buyouts and takeovers
come at the expense of other corporate constituencies such as bondholders and employees. See
Coffee, supra note 10.
31. Cases and commentary addressing investment advisor liability in the context of a tender
offer, cash-out merger, or management buyout are scant. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., No.
58,1981 (Del. Feb. 9, 1982), withdrawn, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Note, The Standard of Care
Required of an Investment Banker to Minority Shareholders in a Cash-Out Merger: Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 98 (1983); Note, Investment Bankers' Fairness Opinions in
Corporate Control Transactions, 96 YALE L.J. 119 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Fairness Opinions].
[Vol. 41:207
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II. MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS
A. The Environment and Mechanics of Management Buyouts
Large buyouts3 2 are a recent phenomenon. Even though one hun-
dred million dollar buyouts did not appear until the late 1970s,33 such
transactions are now commonplace. Of the top 200 deals by size in
1986-including all mergers, buyouts, restructurings, spin-offs, and
cash-outs-approximately one-fifth were buyouts. 4 Ten of the twenty-
five largest control transactions closed in 1986 were buyouts-each for
an amount exceeding one billion dollars. 5 Large cash-outs, on the other
hand, usually occur only as the second stage of a two-tier tender offer;
the first stage consists of a cash tender offer for control, which may
itself be part of a management buyout."
In these "going private" transactions, a group of investors buys
enough of the stock of a publicly held company to exempt the company
from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration re-
quirement under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.37
The investors "take the company private." In a buyout, as distin-
guished from a cash-out or a take-out, the buyer does not begin with a
controlling interest in the target company. 8 If the purchasing group in
32. These transactions may include LBOs or MBOs, effectuated through a self-tender offer
or merger with a shell corporation. For discussions of many of the legal issues addressed in this
Article, see Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and the Limits of Fiduciary
Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1985); Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730
(1985); Note, Leveraged Buyout, Management Buyout, and Going Private Corporate Control
Transactions: Insider Trading or Efficient Market Economics?, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 685 (1986).
For articles addressing the mechanics of the transactions with particular emphasis on the various
means of financing LBOs, see S. DIAMOND, LEVERAGED BUYOUTS (1985); Mancuso & Ferenbach, The
LBO: Financial Tool of the 80s, FIN. ExEcuTIvE, Aug. 1984, at 20; Wallner, Leveraged Buyouts: A
Review of the State of the Art, Part I, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Fall 1979, at 4; Wallner, Lever-
aged Buyouts: A Review of the State of the Art, Part II, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Winter 1980,
at 16.
33. See DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Rice, Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder
Wealth, 27 J.L. & EcON. 367, 381 (1984); Ross, How the Champs Do Leveraged Buyouts, FORTUNE,
Jan. 23, 1984, at 70, 74.
34. The Top 200 Deals, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 17, 1987, at 276; see also The Top 100, MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS, May-June 1987, at 47.
35. The Top 100, supra note 34, at 47-48. The largest transactions closed during the year
included the buyouts of Beatrice at $6.25 billion, Safeway at $5.34 billion, and R.H. Macy at $3.50
billion. Id.; see also 25 Largest Leveraged Buyouts of All Time, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Nov.-
Dec. 1987, at 49 (since 1984 there have been 22 leveraged buyouts for over a billion dollars).
36. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 884 (6th Cir. 1986) (in response to a
third-party offer, management buyout group negotiated a two-tier offer paying shareholders cash
on the front-end and securities on the back-end of take-out merger); see also Hanson Trust PLC v.
ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1986).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1982).
38. In most of the large buyouts of the past two or three years, the management buyout
group has held less than 10% of the stock of the corporation when the transaction was initiated.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:207
a buyout includes members of the firm's management, the buyout is
known as a "management buyout."39 In a cash-out,40 a majority share-
holder eliminates all minority shareholders by forcing the public
shareholders to surrender their stock for cash.
The purchasing group finances a management buyout by borrowing
funds from commercial banks, insurance companies, investment banks,
venture capitalists, and other institutional investors.41 Some of these in-
vestors also may take an equity position in the now private corporation;
a participating investment banking firm that assists in structuring the
transaction, for example, often will purchase equity in the company at a
low price.42 The repayment of the firm's staggering new debt is usually
accomplished through cash generated by future earnings and by the
sale of some of the firm's assets and businesses.43 This requires that the
firm be a financially sound, mature company with steady earnings and
saleable assets that are peripheral to the firm's main business. Senior
management's participation in the buyout is also considered to be very
important.44
This is a significant change from the smaller buyouts and cash-outs of the 1970s. Cf. DeAngelo,
DeAngelo & Rice, supra note 33, at 383 (finding that for 72 going private transactions from 1973 to
1980 the mean proportion of stock held by management prior to the transaction was approximately
45%).
39. This Article addresses issues common to buyouts of entire corporations, the shares of
which are publicly traded. Many MBOs involve divisions of large corporations. While there is po-
tential for abuse on the part of the management team in divisional buyouts, the opportunities are
much diminished and the corporate parent has a strong unified position from which to negotiate.
Additionally, the purported benefits of divisional buyouts-primarily managerial autonomy and
more direct compensation-are more intuitively appealing. See Lowenstein, supra note 32, at 755-
56; see also 1986 Profile, MERGERS & AcQUISITIONS, May-June 1987, at 64 (listing the 25 largest
divestitures of 1986).
40. For a further description of a cash-out, see Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort
or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 987 (1974); Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corpo-
rate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1072 (1983); Brudney & Chirelstein, A
Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982).
41. See S. DIAMOND, supra note 32, at 43-91; Wallner, supra note 32.
42. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, supra note 23 (reporting that Merrill Lynch Capital Partners
contributed 55% of the equity capital in the $2 billion buyout of Supermarkets General); see also
Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1986); cf. supra note 23.
43. See, e.g., Waldman & Freeman, Burlington Industries' Denim Plant Sale Catapults Old
Rival to Near Top of Field, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1987, at 7, col. 3 (a management buyout group that
outbid Dominion Textile for control of Burlington Industries subsequently sold one of Burlington's
leading plants to its competitor to finance the buyout); Buyout of Burlington Industries Inc. May
Force Firm to Become Much Smaller, Wall St. J., May 22, 1987, at 6, col. 2; Beatrice Buy-Out,
supra note 26.
44. While this has been the traditional wisdom, young or less financially stable firms increas-
ingly are becoming the targets of MBOs. Additionally, in some buyouts senior management's par-
ticipation may no longer be as essential as it once was. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 178 (Del. 1986) (management excluded from revised buyout
proposal). In some cases former executives of the target firm have been coupled with management
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In management buyouts, the management group's perception of the
value of the firm as a private company must differ from the value of the
firm as reflected by the public capital markets and estimates made by
potential third-party suitors.4 Speculation on the reason for the dispar-
ity is what makes management buyouts so controversial.47 A straight
management buyout does not involve a major merger or management
change;"8 therefore, the primary determinants of the firm's value are its
assets 19 and its earning power with the existing senior management per-
sonnel substantially intact. In the public's eye, if managers conclude
that the value of the assets and earning power of the firm exceeds the
value as determined by the market, the managers must have inside in-
buyout specialty firms to make bids for their former employers; usually to the exclusion of current
senior executives from the buyout group, which gives rise to the term "hostile management
buyout." In the buyout of Beatrice, Donald Kelly, the former CEO of Esmark Corp., which Bea-
trice had previously acquired, was brought in to lead a buyout of Beatrice along with Kohlberg,
Kravis, Roberts & Co. See Beatrice Buy-Out, supra note 26; see also Leveraged Buyout Set by
Allegheny International Inc., Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1987, at 3, col. 4 (initial buyout proposal with-
out management participation approved by board of directors).
45. Booth, supra note 32, at 634-35. Professor Richard Booth suggests that this difference
may reflect management's control over decision making in the corporation; i.e., management "does
not bear the risk of its investment being used in a manner with which it disagrees." Id. at 635.
Professor Booth acknowledges, however, that this difference in valuation also may be due to an
informational advantage which management may hold as against the market. Id. For a discussion
of some of the insider trading problems arising in management buyouts, see infra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text.
46. This may not be true, however, if the management buyout group is allowed to engage in
blocking activity that is sufficient to thwart any third-party offers. See infra notes 111-26 and
accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Sommer, "Going Private". A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, Law Advisory
Council Lecture, Notre Dame Law School, reprinted in [1974-75 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 80,010, at 84,696; Stein, Going Private is Unethical, FORTUNE, Nov. 11, 1985, at 169;
Stein, supra note 24; Thackray & Main, Heading Toward Leveraged-Buyout Burnout?, AcRoss
THE BOARD, Dec. 1984, at 30; Longstreth, New Controls for Leveraged Buyouts, N.Y. Times, Nov.
6, 1983, § 3, at 3, col. 1; Round Trips, supra note 26.
48. In buyouts by outsiders, the determinants of value for the bidder are more varied and
can include, for example, gains created by the special fit of the purchaser and target or by displac-
ing the dominant management team in the target and replacing it with a better team. Managers
participating in buyouts cannot use these common justifications because the buyout does not cre-
ate a new combination of firms or a change in management personnel; there is only a change in the
identity of the owners.
49. A large number of buyouts are dependent on the management buyout group selling off
assets or complete businesses to pay off part of the debt load taken on in the buyout. See, e.g.,
Beatrice Buy-Out, supra note 26. It is frequently the case that the estimated "bust-up value" per
share of a target corporation in a control struggle is well in excess of the current price of the
target's stock. See, e.g., Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 177 (Del. 1986);
Dayton Hudson Stake Acquired By Dart Group, Wall St. J., June 22, 1987, at 3, col. 1 (stating
that "[a]nalysts have estimated Dayton Hudson's break-up value at $65 to $75 a share" when the
stock was selling at $56.50); see also Booth, supra note 32, at 646-47 (noting potential benefits
from deconglomeration); Gogel, supra note 2, at 28 (noting that "the market's view of manage-
ment's capabilities may cause the price of the securities of the company as a whole to be less than
the price which could be achieved in a piecemeal sale of the company's corporate assets").
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formation. It is no surprise then that management buyouts have a tar-
nished reputation.
B. The Potential for Abuse
There are three common indictments of management buyouts when
they prove to be prodigiously profitable for the purchasing group. First,
management's use of buyouts involves the misappropriation of inside
information.50 Executives, particularly in languishing companies, have
access to information which indicates that better times are ahead so
they buy the company to enjoy the boon. Second, managers profit by
doing things for which they were paid well to do and that they should
have done before the buyout for the benefit of the former sharehold-
ers.51 Shareholders, reading reports that the private company is run
better than the public company they once owned, ask why the execu-
tives of the firm did not, as they now have done on their own behalf,
float as much debt, fire those same incompetent or redundant subordi-
nates, sell those same assets, or work those same twelve hour days when
they worked for substantial salaries as the shareholders' agents. Indeed,
the most cynical observers claim that executives will deliberately allow
a company to degenerate for a period, or even distort the financial
figures, in order to reduce the purchase price and maximize the profit
from the management buyout.52 And third, managers take too much of
the negotiating pie in the purchase because there is no one aggressively
representing the interests of the selling shareholders. 3
The first charge, that managers' profits from playing the buyout
game may be a function of improper use of inside information, is most
troubling because it almost always will be true to some degree, 5 and
because policing the use of inside information in such transactions is so
difficult. While the buyout group is subject to the disclosure provisions
of the federal securities laws in making its offer,55 the importance of
50. See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Se-
curities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979); Note, Corporate Morality and Management Buyouts,
41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1015 (1984). But cf. Note, supra note 32.
51. See Stein, supra note 24.
52. Cf. Crazy Eddie, supra note 25; Thackray & Main, supra note 47, at 34.
53. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 24; cf. Oesterle I, supra note 11; Oesterle II, supra note 11.
54. Managers will always have greater knowledge of and access to information concerning
corporate affairs and opportunities regardless of the level of disclosure required. Much of this in-
formation may be "immaterial" in its individual quantum, see TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), but of great importance to a manager intimately familiar with its totality
and its ramifications upon the corporation's operations. See also Field v. Allyn, 457 A.2d 1089
(Del. Ch.), aff'd, 467 A.2d 1274 (Del. 1983).
55. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982); Exchange Act Rule 13e-3, 17
C.F.R. 240.13e-3 and Schedule 13E-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (see particularly items 8 and 9,
requiring discussion of the fairness of the transaction and disclosure of appraisals); see also Plaza
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new patents, investment opportunities, or changing competitive circum-
stances may not be disclosed or may be lost in the boilerplate language
and intentional obfuscation that so often characterizes such disclosures.
Likewise, when the benefits from such developments or opportunities
accrue to the buyout group a few years later, searching the pudding for
the proof that may establish liability to past or present shareholders
may be murky and particularly unrewarding.
Managers may not only profit from the use of inside information,
but they also may create opportunities to exploit inside information.
For example, managers, in contemplation of a buyout, may repose while
the corporation degenerates or may manipulate the flow of financial in-
formation from the corporation, which lowers the buyout price and
raises management's potential profits. Once the buyout is consum-
mated, management can correct the effects of their own acts and in-
crease the value of the company.
The second charge is that managers who follow buyouts with dra-
matic business reverses must have been acting irresponsibly when they
did not undertake the same measures on behalf of public shareholders
that they subsequently have taken to bring success to their private
company. Managers have significant discretion over the accounting pol-
icies employed by the firm5 6 and even greater control over their own
efforts on behalf of the corporation.57 While it is understandable that
the enormous stake which an individual executive may have in a now
private corporation may encourage him or her to devote a bit more ef-
fort at the margin, the drastic changes seen in many buyout targets
once private are not explained so easily. Furthermore, the changes in
business procedure witnessed after a buyout are often within the realm
Sees. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1535, 1544 (E.D. Mich.), afi'd sub nom. Edelman v.
Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986). These disclosure requirements parallel those re-
quired for third-party tender offerors. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Schedule 14D-1, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-100 (1987). See generally Going Private Transactions Under Rule 13e-3, Exchange Act
Release No. 17,719, 46 Fed. Reg. 22571 (1981).
56. See, e.g., Andresky, Indecent Disclosure, FORBES, Aug. 13, 1984, at 92; Andresky, Setting
the Date, FORBES, July 16, 1984, at 90; Andresky, Double Standard, FORBES, Nov. 22, 1982, at 178;
Greene, Big Bath? Or a Little One?, FORBES, Oct. 6, 1986, at 118, 120; Greene, How to Owe Money
Without Seeming To, FORBES, May 26, 1980, at 54; Konrad, Take Your Fees and Come Out Fight-
ing, FORBES, July 18, 1983, at 98; Smith, Puddle Muddle, FORBES, Oct. 8, 1984, at 92. But see
DeAngelo, Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study of Management
Buyouts of Public Stockholders, AcCOUNTNG REV., July 1986, at 400.
57. One story that makes the rounds in the halls of investment banks is the following: When
approached by an investment banker involved in the financing of a proposed buyout, a CEO, real-
izing the tremendous gains that could accrue to him in an MBO, claimed he could easily remove
one billion dollars in needless assets and overhead off the company's books within three to six
months after a buyout. Asked why he had not done it already, the CEO responded that he did not
"want to rock the boat without need."
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of management's abilities, and perhaps duties, prior to the buyout."
The third charge, that no one adequately represents shareholders'
interests in the negotiating of the buyout, stems directly from the con-
flicting roles of management and inside directors in the process of
approving a management buyout. The charge is even stronger when one
considers the close personal relationships that often exist between the
inside directors, who will probably be equity participants in the buyout,
and the "independent outside directors" who are charged with the pri-
mary responsibility for protecting the public shareholders' interests.
Furthermore, because outside directors' knowledge of corporate affairs
and financial information is almost invariably inferior to that of inside
directors, the outside directors increasingly will tend to defer to the in-
siders' judgment.5 To see the power of this charge, one need only con-
sider several recent management buyout transactions in which the
outside directors unanimously approved buyouts by management that
were subsequently challenged by higher offers from third-party bidders,
to which management quickly responded with higher offers of their
own. In some cases management's bid was increased by ten percent or
more when confronted by an outside bidder.6 0 Why should these higher
bids not have been forthcoming simply as a result of the negotiating
efforts of the "independent outside directors" working with full access
to corporate information?
These problems inspire many to advocate a quick fix: prohibit all
management buyouts. 1 This quick fix, in addition to presenting severe
definitional problems, 2 underestimates the benefits that may come
58. With this in mind, the leveraged recapitalization would seem a more appropriate re-
sponse to the exigencies that manager's claim justify the use of MBOs. Although managers in
MBOs wax prolific on the advantages of debt financing, why did they not simply recapitalize the
public company?
59. See infra note 177.
60. See, e.g., National Amusements Wins Bidding War For Viacom With Its Offer of $3.4
Billion, Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1987, at 2, col. 3 (final offer from management buyout group of $3.3
billion); Two Rival Suitors for Viacom Sweeten Bids Again; Fight Expected to Continue, Mar. 3,
1987, at 5, col. 2 (management buyout group increased bid to $3.23 billion; outside bidder raised
offer to $3.35 billion); Managers Raise Bid for Viacom To $3.1 Billion, Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1987,
at 4, col. 1; Viacom Board Clears New Bid Of $2.97 Billion, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 8, col. 1
(target's board unanimously approved bid by management-led buyout group).
61. See Brudney, Efficient Markets and Fair Shares in Parent-Subsidiary Mergers, 4 J.
CORP. L. 63 (1978); Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L. REV. 1019 (1975); Brudney &
Chirelstein, supra note 40, at 1366; cf. Lowenstein, supra note 32, at 779-84 (advocating regula-
tions to create an auction market whenever management proposes a buyout).
62. What participation by how many managers of what rank will constitute a "management"
buyout? What is the line between a large share repurchase plan and an MBO? For example, in the
control struggle for Viacom International, management and the third-party bidder competed
against one another primarily by upping the stake the public shareholders would continue to have
in the successor corporation. See National Amusements Wins Bidding War For Viacom with Its
Offer of $3.4 Billion, Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1987, at 2, col. 3; National Amusements, as Expected,
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from legitimate management buyouts.6 3 Even those management
buyouts that occur under suspicious circumstances give target share-
holders abnormal returns on their capital investment because of the
premium over market price offered for their shares.6 4 At best the target
corporation shareholders' argument is that the premium paid should be
higher. Shareholders argue that, once the firm becomes a target in the
market for corporate control, they should receive a premium based not
on share prices that existed before the firm became a target, but on
share prices determined by the market for control-a market in which
substantial premiums are the norm.
The shareholders' argument has a grasping quality in those cases in
which the management group's offer exceeds any outstanding offers
from third parties. But the shareholders' complaint still may be valid
under the circumstances if management has actively disabled other bid-
ders,6 5 or the management group has usurped the value of nonpublic
information or has taken advantage of poor representation of share-
holder interests in the price bargain. Thus a legitimate management
buyout must meet each of three conditions: first, the management
group must pay more than any other third-party bidder in a fair auc-
tion;6 second, the management group must not be misusing inside in-
Lifts Viacom Bid Again; Move Pressures Rival, Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1987, at 7, col. 1; Two Rival
Suitors for Viacom Sweeten Bids Again; Fight Expected to Continue, Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1987, at
5, col. 2; see also LBO Stubs Bid to Top Interest In Buyout Boom, Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1987, at
27, col. 3.
63. See Booth, supra note 32, at 645-49; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 1194-1204;
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 40, at 705-11; Mancuso & Ferenbach, supra note 32, at 22; see
also infra note 110.
64. See Jensen, supra note 2, at 325; Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control,
11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 9-16, 39-40 (1983).
65. Professor John Coffee argues that state law ought to allow a firm to favor MBOs over
hostile bidders with limited financial assistance, because "its victory may minimize the economic
losses, dislocation, and trauma experienced by nonshareholder constituencies" in hostile tender
offers. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 91. The extent of this justification is unclear. For example,
would Professor Coffee support MBOs that generate profits from the use of inside information
when the buyout is in response to a hostile tender offer? In other words, can one argue that mini-
mizing economic distortion for non-shareholder constituencies serves to legitimize otherwise illegit-
imate reasons for a management buyout? See also Gogel, supra note 2, at 30 (noting that
management control of a restructuring or buyout may provide a controlled format for change,
providing more efficient alteration of the corporation and a minimization of the trauma imposed
on various corporate constituencies).
66. This assumes that the financing of any third-party bidder's offer is equally secure as
management's. If the third-party financing is extremely speculative, this may give management
adequate justification for rejecting a higher bid. Directors, and courts if necessary, must scrutinize
very carefully any such claims by management when used as a justification for rejecting an ostensi-
bly higher bid. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1986); Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 179 n.7 (Del. 1986). But see Booth, supra note
32, at 642, 654 (arguing that management may be justified in making a lower bid and in rejecting a
higher outside offer because of management's existing stake in the corporation and differing means
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formation; and, third, the shareholders must have strong independent
representation in the bargaining process.
C. Explaining the Premium Price in Management Buyouts
The question remains, however, even if a management buyout
meets these conditions for legitimacy, how can the purchasing group
afford to pay a large premium over market price for the company's
shares? What can the managers do privately that they could not or
should not have done as salaried executives of a publicly held com-
pany? Unless there is some explanation for the premium that is not
tied to one of the abuses, perhaps the quick fix is sound-management
buyouts should be eliminated. Six responses with varying degrees of
persuasion, however, may justify management buyouts.67
First, private companies are not subject to the many burdens im-
posed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and other governmentally
imposed regulations on public companies. Private companies, for exam-
ple, do not have to file with the SEC or circulate periodic reports and
proxy materials to public shareholders in order to comply with detailed
SEC and associated accounting rules and regulations.68 Stock exchange
and broker-dealer regulations are likewise no longer of concern. One
wonders, however, how substantial these savings are; it seems highly
unlikely that these savings can explain the millions of dollars in profits
of valuing stock). The scope of Professor Booth's argument is limited, however, by his implicit
assumption that management owns a significant amount of the target's stock. While this may have
been true of the smaller buyouts in the 1970s, it is no longer true of the large buyouts that are so
controversial today. See supra note 38.
67. We have omitted a seventh possible argument-that non-shareholder constituencies are
better off-for several reasons. First, to the extent that managers are the non-shareholder constitu-
ency in issue, their position is discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 110-14. Second, for
other constituencies like nonmanagement employees, creditors, and local residents, the evidence
which indicates that they are better off after an MBO than after a hostile takeover by an outside
bidder is very speculative. Many MBOs often effect restructurings that mimic what a hostile bid-
der would do if it was able to buy control of the firm; parts of the firm are sold, some of the
management team released, firm facilities are closed, and so on. Moreover, even if nonmanagement
constituencies are better off after buyouts, if their gains come at the expense of the shareholders
and are a justification for such buyouts, can other corporate decisions (e.g., the decision to build a
new factory) be justified by the same calculus? Once the primacy of shareholders' interests is dis-
missed, a wide array of traditionally unacceptable corporate actions can be justified as furthering
some corporate constituency's interests. Finally, nonmanagement constituencies can, ex ante, ac-
commodate the risk of LBOs in their arrangements with the firm. Bondholders, for example, can
demand higher yields or can demand veto power in bond indentures. That bondholders lose money
in LBOs is not by itself an indication that they were treated unfairly; they knowingly may have
taken a risk and lost just like the holders of long positions in a bear market.
68. See DeAngelo & DeAngelo, Management Buyouts of Publicly Traded Corporations, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., May-June 1987, at 38, 44 (noting that the savings from LBOs includes salaries and
overhead for stockholder relations departments and the valuable time management must spend
dealing with stockholders, financial analysts, and the financial press).
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earned by members of the purchasing groups.6 9 Moreover, these savings
would seem to be more than offset by the fees paid to the investment
bankers who structure the buyout. Large-scale buyouts typically gener-
ate a minimum fee of ten million dollars, and the fees can exceed fifty
million dollars.70
Second, assuming that no material, nonpublic information is in-
volved, the management group simply may have a forecast of the firm's
future different than that held by the public market. The management
buyout group may believe, for example, that the firm's cash flow from
earnings is stronger and more stable than is believed to be the case by
public investors. In other words, the management buyout group may
believe that the firm is undervalued by the market. Adherents of the
semi-strong or strong version of the efficient market theory would scoff
at this claim, for, according to those theories, the public market price
best incorporates the value of all public information.7' In other words,
the management purchaser group paying a premium over market for
undervalued stock is more likely to be wrong than right.72 This is not to
say, however, that the firm's shareholders should be prohibited from
enjoying the benefits of their managers' foolishness. The theory does
suggest, however, that if false perceptions of undervalued stock are the
dominant reason for legitimate management buyouts, then the number
of management buyouts should diminish as managers themselves learn
of their poor odds. But in fact, the number of buyouts continues to
grow rapidly.73
An important variation of this justification is that managers have
an estimate of the firm's future value given some radical change in its
business operations that is higher than the valuation they estimate will
appear in the public market once the change in course is announced.7 1
Rather than announce a major business restructuring before the success
of such a plan is more evident and risk having the stock price plummet
(with its consequential problems including shareholder litigation, an in-
crease in financing costs, and the like that may defeat the restructur-
ing), the managers buy the company and complete the restructuring
69. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
70. See Lowenstein, supra note 32, at 757 n.98; see also Merrill Lynch, supra note 23 (re-
porting that Merrill's fees for the buyouts of Supermarkets General and Fruehauf Corp. totaled
$52 million and $40 million, respectively); Kohlberg Kravis Fee, supra note 17; Dannen, supra
note 18, at 153.
71. For a discussion of the efficient market theory, see Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms
of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
72. Because the purchasers have only a 50-50 chance of beating the market, the greater the
premium paid over market the more likely the loss.
73. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
74. See Booth, supra note 32, at 634-35.
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before re-offering the company to the public market for evaluation.
Likewise, managers may assert that the company has very bright long-
term prospects but that the market has taken a short-term perspective
and thus undervalues the company." Management buyout participants
argue that as a private company they will not be subjected to the short-
term whims of the market and can better implement long-term
investment projects. Once again, this argument really boils down to an
assertion that management of a target is a better judge of a firm's worth
than the stock market. If the market places a much lower value on a
company's future earnings stream than on the maximization of the
company's present earnings, it is because the collective judgment of
market participants has valued the future earnings using a higher dis-
count rate. A higher discount rate may be a consequence of high real
interest rates or expected inflation, or because the market is using a
lower probability measure of the future earnings actually occurring. In
either case, there is simply no reason that managers should not act to
maximize stock prices given shareholders' preferences for higher cur-
rent earnings rather than increased future earnings.
Third, until the Tax Reform Act of 1986,76 management buyouts
provided unique and substantial tax advantages. Indeed, the tax sav-
ings may have been the single most important factor in the early
buyout boom.77 Managers, in essence, would create and then split the
tax savings with their shareholders. The tax savings came from two
events: first, the sale re-established a high tax basis in depreciated or
depleted assets held by the firm; and, second, the firm enjoyed substan-
tial interest deductions on the debt financing. Changes in the 1986 Tax
Code, however, have nullified the first tax advantage, while the second
advantage by itself has never sufficed as an explanation for manage-
ment buyouts. Congress eliminated the first tax benefit, that of re-
establishing a tax basis in depreciated or depleted assets, by taxing the
firm at sale for the increased basis received by the purchasers. 8 Thus
75. For examples of this viewpoint, see Drucker, Corporate Takeovers-What Is To Be
Done?, 82 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1986); Fogg, Takeovers: Last Chance for Self-Restraint, HARv. Bus.
REV., Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 30; Williams, It's Time for a Takeover Moratorium, FORTUNE, July 22,
1985, at 133. But see Pound, Lehn & Jarrell, Are Takeovers Hostile to Economic Performance?,
REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 25 (suggesting that empirical data do not indicate economic detri-
ment attributable to short-term perspective of securities markets).
76. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631(a), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 2271 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 337).
77. See Ginsburg, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions, 38 TAX L. REV. 171 (1983); Stoney &
Zonana, Tax Considerations in Leveraged Acquisitions, in LEVERAGED BUYOUTS, 393 CORP. L. &
PRAc. HANDBOOK 41 (PLI 1982); Lowenstein, supra note 32, at 759-64; Big Tax Advantages
Prompt Rise in Leveraged Buyouts, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1983, at 31, col. 1.
78. See Batchelar, M & A and the Tax Act of 1986, BuYouTs & AcQUISITIONS, May-June
1987, at 39; Solinga, LBOs, Junk Bonds and the New Tax Laws, BUYOUTS & AcQUISITIONS, May-
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the purchasers obtain a new tax basis in the assets, but buy a corpora-
tion with a substantial tax obligation that will usually more than offset
the value of the depreciation deductions.79 Moreover, the interest de-
duction, which is often advanced as a significant motivation for
buyouts, is not unique to buyouts. A firm's existing management can
recapitalize the company without selling it in order to take advantage of
the interest deduction. Without demonstrating that buyouts are a sub-
stantially cheaper method of acquiring large interest deductions than
floating more debt securities or adopting stock repurchase programs,
which also increase the debt-equity ratio, the interest deduction cannot,
by itself, be a justification for management buyouts.
The only remaining tax benefits associated with buyouts hinge on
the questionable legal status of "mirror" transactions.8 0 The mirror
transaction was devised to compensate for the repeal of the General
Utilities doctrines' and if valid, creates tax gains in certain specialized
June 1987, at 33; Wood, General Utilities Repeal: Injecting New Levies into M & A, MERGERS &
AcQuISITIONS, Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 44.
79. The taxable gain is equal to the basis adjustment and is due immediately, while the
depreciation deductions on the basis increase can be taken only over time and therefore do not
offset the immediate tax obligation.
80. The transaction depends on a technical reading of Treasury Regulation § 1.1502-34 (as
amended in 1966), which qualifies some liquidations for nonrecognition treatment under § 332.
The Department of Treasury has threatened that it might change the rule to stop the practice. See
Sheppard, Mirror Transactions Go Forward, 35 TAX NOTES 1057 (1987) [hereinafter Sheppard, Go
Forward]. In Revenue Proceeding 87-23, 1987-21 I.R.B. 18, the Treasury announced that it will not
rule on mirror transactions until it has studied the matter further. See Treasury Refuses to Take
Position on Tax Treatment of Mirror Subsidiary Transactions, 33 TAx NOTES 1073 (1986) (Letter
from Treasury Secretary James Baker to chairmen and ranking minority members of the Senate
Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee); Sheppard, Treasury Punts on
Mirror Transactions, 33 TAX NOTES 988 (1986). The Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, Dan Rostenkowski, also believes that mirror transactions are taxable. See Sheppard,
The Mirror Cracked, 34 TAX NOTES 538 (1987); see also Sheppard, Room Full of Mirrors: Enforc-
ing General Utilities Repeal, 33 TAx NOTES 281 (1986) [hereinafter Sheppard, Room Full of Mir-
rors]; Corporations Jump into Tax Debate Defending Mirror Subs, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG.,
Nov. 16, 1987, at 48. For a general discussion of mirror transactions, see infra notes 81-86 and
accompanying text.
Shortly before publication of this Article, even the use of mirror transactions was curtailed
sharply by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203 100 Stat. 1330
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), which restricts the utility of this technique. See Pren-
tice Hall's Complete Guide to the Tax Law of 1987, Fed. Taxes (P-H), at 1 33 (Jan. 7, 1988).
Coopers & Lybrand, An Overview of the Principle Provisions of the 1987 Tax Act, 38 TAx NOTES
67, 70 (1988).
81. For a discussion of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, see J. EUsTICE, J. KuNTZ,
C. LEwis & T. DEERING, THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 1 2.03 (1987);
see also Lobenhofer, The Repeal of General Utilities For Corporate Liquidations-The Conse-
quences of Incomplete and Unexpected Tax Reform, 4 AKRON TAX J. 153, 181-84 (1987) (also
discussing the role of mirror transactions as a replacement for the General Utilities doctrine);
Shube, Corporate Income or Loss on Distributions of Property: An Analysis of General Utilities,
12 J. CORP. TAx'N 3 (1985) (discussing General Utilities doctrine); Willens, General Utilities Is
Dead: The TRA of '86 Ends an Era, J. AccT., Nov. 1986, at 102.
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transactions. The size of the gain offered is substantial, which leads
buyout groups to accept the risk that the deal may not work, even
though lawyers will not sign opinion letters on the legality of such deals.
Mirror transactions are tax-driven restructurings effected when the
buyout group forms subsidiaries of a holding company to mirror operat-
ing subsidiaries of the target corporation. The buyout group contributes
capital to the mirror subsidiaries in proportion to the fair market value
of the operating subsidiaries to be sold. The mirror subsidiaries also
own, in proportion to the same fair market values, all stock of the shell
corporation used to acquire all the target's stock. After the acquisition,
which uses the shell corporation's stock as consideration, the target is
then liquidated into the mirror subsidiaries.8 2 Stock of selected mirror
subsidiaries is sold to third parties, and no one recognizes the built-in
gain in the assets held by the mirror subsidiaries because stock and not
assets are sold. 3
Unlike pre-1986 transactions, however, which could be motivated
solely by a tax basis readjustment, mirror transactions allow only a
deferral of tax gains in the sale of appreciated assets. Moreover, they
require a new intermediate purchaser. Thus, mirror transactions favor
new buyers over existing management when the firm decides to sell ap-
preciated assets to a third party. The new buyers in a leveraged buyout
can defer the gain while the corporation itself cannot."4 In a recent
buyout of Owens-Illinois for 3.6 billion dollars, the tax benefits result-
ing from the use of mirror subsidiaries could have been as much as 750
million dollars because the company's assets had a tax basis of approxi-
mately 1.6 billion dollars.8 5 The risk is that if mirror transactions are
held to be taxable, buyout groups would owe tax equal to the immedi-
ate recognition of all built-in gain in the target's assets at the time of
liquidation.8
Fourth, management buyouts may be justified because top manag-
82. This is the controversial stage. Treasury Regulation § 1.502-34 ostensibly allows the mir-
ror subsidiaries to aggregate their ownership of the target corporation for the purpose of qualifying
under the 80% ownership rule of § 332.
83. The purchaser may not completely escape the tax burden because the purchaser does not
get a stepped-up basis in the purchased assets. The recognition of the gain is simply postponed
and shifted to the purchaser.
84. Sheppard, Room Full of Mirrors, supra note 80, at 281 (quoting Rep. Dan Rostenkowski
of Illinois, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, who believes this favoritism of new
owners should cause Congress to eliminate mirror transactions).
85. See Sheppard, Go Forward, supra note 80, at 1057; New Tax Bill Threatens To Kill
Most Debt-Financed Takeovers, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Oct. 19, 1987, at 16 (noting that taxa-
tion of mirror transactions would be accomplished by applying the Treasury's deferred intercom-
pany transaction regulations to the merger of the target's asset into the mirror subsidiaries-these
regulations have not previously been applied to mirror subsidiaries).
86. See supra note 80.
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ers recognize that a particular firm is suffering substantial agency costs
or, in other words, that the management team is performing marginally
because of an ineffective corporate monitoring process. A management
buyout, which will give managers a more substantial equity stake in the
corporation, will induce the management team to perform more faith-
fully the goal of maximizing the worth of the business. The unadorned
agency cost position, however, is not very satisfying. If a firm has shirk-
ing managers, an alterative way of encouraging better management per-
formance is to increase the amount of compensation contingent on
corporate performance through, for example, option plans or stock ap-
preciation rights.8 7 Since managers themselves have a good deal of con-
trol over their own compensation plans, management buyouts carried
out to improve the monitoring process seemingly involve a taking of
corporate opportunity-the opportunity to motivate managers-for
personal gain. This situation is not materially different from undertak-
ing a management buyout with more conventional kinds of inside infor-
mation such as the discovery of a valuable ore field under the obsolete
factory, for example. The position provides a legitimate reason for man-
agement buyouts only if there is no less costly method for reducing
agency costs; that is, substantial agency costs are inherent in the firm if
it is publicly held.88 If so, then these firms should undergo round trips
periodically, 9 as managers (or outsiders) take the firms private, trim
87. However, as the market crash of October 19, 1987 has made clear, options plans are not a
panacea. The problems that the market crash caused are only one example of the complexities of
designing and implementing effective compensation plans, but are illustrative of the difficulties
surrounding such plans in the face of volatile markets. The market crash substantially reduced the
value of many executive compensation packages created during the last two years. Furthermore,
public shareholders who have seen their stock portfolios slashed in value by the crash may be
angered particularly by corporations which quickly extend new option packages to executives at
post-crash prices.
88. Much of the recent business literature that endorses buyouts as valuable transactions
points to the increased incentives and motivation of managers as the key to successful leveraged
buyouts. See, e.g., Ferenbach, supra note 26, at 59; Glynn, The Joy of Going Private, INST. INVES-
TroR, Dec. 1986, at 111, 114; Selby, supra note 3, at 118. Fiduciary duties to the firm's former public
shareholders are seldom mentioned in these glowing descriptions of the super manager who be-
comes a multimillionaire through ownership of his former employer's firm. If indeed the value of
the employee-managed firm can differ so dramatically from the highly leveraged, owner-managed
firm, the fundamental question of absentee ownership of America's corporations is again ripe for
rethinking. Cf. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
89. The market crash has substantially reduced the stock prices of many companies that
have only recently returned to public ownership following a buyout. At these low market prices the
companies again are being considered for buyouts by insiders. See Smith, Market's Depressed
Prices Are Breeding a Variation of the Leveraged Buy-Out, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1988, at 42, col. 3.
Because the buyout group typically has retained a large stake in the company when it was re-
offered to the public, a second buyout appears to be much easier and cheaper to execute. This may
make periodic round trips or "re-LBOs" a common solution to the problems that may develop in
publicly held companies, including agency cost problems that may be a function of corporate over
expansion or risk aversion.
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the fat and shape them up, and then re-offer them to the public.90 With
each buyout, the gains from reducing agency costs are split between
managers and the firm's shareholders (the shareholders get a premium
over market price on the sale), presumably gains that the shareholders
are themselves unable to realize. This scenario, even though arguably in
the best interests of the shareholders, is disturbing because the manag-
ers, who ideally already should be acting in the best interests of the
shareholders, seem to profit from their own lack of allegiance. It is not
hard to sympathize with the frustration of public shareholders: "Our
CEO makes two million a year in salary and he will only work 'til six if
he owns the company?!"
In an extreme case, it seems that management buyouts could create
a moral hazard. The opportunity for management buyouts may en-
courage managers of publicly held firms to shirk their responsibilities,
allowing managers strategically to increase their personal profits from
successful buyouts. Of course, the countervailing pressure from outside
bidders ought to eliminate such temptations because excessive shirking
ought to attract outside bidders as well. Perhaps the most favorable
gloss that can be put on this form of the agency cost argument is that
management buyouts (if they are the first to bid for control of the firm,
that is, the bid is not in response to an outside bid) will encourage out-
siders to bid for the firm. The resulting auction between the outsiders
and the management group will maximize the public shareholders' slice
of any gains attributable to the owner-managers' success at reducing
overall agency costs after the buyout. In other words, management
buyout proposals may signal to the market that a firm is a prime take-
over target. This pressure from outside bidders, however, may be neu-
tralized if the board of directors can favor management buyouts over
third-party offers for control.
Fifth, because owner-managers do not have to discount the value of
the corporation for the possibility of agency unfaithfulness and public
shareholders do (even if agents have been faithful up to this point), the
value of the company is higher in the hands of managers than in the
hands of public shareholders. Professor Richard Booth argues that
managers assume less risk than public shareholders in owning a partic-
ular firm.9' Public shareholders must discount the value of their owner-
90. Round trips will be beneficial if gains in reducing agency costs exceed the transaction
costs of the buyout and sufficiently change the risk/reward framework for the buyout group to
allow the managers to share with shareholders the gains of reducing agency costs through a pre-
mium priced offer. Taking the company public again will be profitable if the benefits from diversi-
fication of risk, and an expanded capital base to facilitate growth, outweigh the marginal expansion
of agency costs once these costs have been minimized through private ownership.
91. Booth, supra note 32, at 635.
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ship interest for the possibility of shirking or opportunistic behavior by
their managers, while managers who are owners do not. As a conse-
quence, managers can pay a market premium for the ownership of a
publicly held corporation without sacrificing the potential gains availa-
ble to them.
Public shareholders undoubtedly must discount the value of the
shares to account for the risk of unfaithful agents. At issue, however, is
the size of the discount and how compelling an explanation it is for
management buyouts. Before an assessment of its merits, the argument
needs some refinement. For some firms, the shareholders' discount for
agency costs is overshadowed by advantages in the capital markets of
selling equity versus debt; otherwise no companies would ever be pub-
lic. The argument must be then that some firms are mistakenly in the
wrong category; they are public and should be private because the dis-
count for agency unfaithfulness is no longer offset by advantages in the
capital markets. The managers of these firms rectify the mistake
through a management buyout.
Refined in this way, the argument does not seem to be a compelling
justification for buyouts. As noted in the discussion on the agency cost
position, compensation packages and penalties for managers' perform-
ance that are tied to stock prices can reduce the risk of unfaithful man-
agers and, therefore, reduce the discount associated with the company's
stock. Since finding sound compensation packages is one obligation of
the managers of publicly held companies, accepting agency unfaithful-
ness as a justification for management buyouts seems to sanctify or
even encourage poor performance by managers in public firms. It is dif-
ficult to believe that any discount for management unfaithfulness that
is inherent to public corporations, once appropriate compensation pack-
ages and penalties are in place, explains the size of the premiums in
management buyouts, which on average exceed forty percent.92 More-
over, and probably more importantly, because many management
buyouts are soon followed by the firm going public at a price far in
excess of the buyout price,9" it is hard to attribute the buyout premium
solely to the benefits of eliminating a discount for potential manage-
ment faithlessness. 94
The final justification is a more refined version of the agency cost
problem. While the fourth justification focuses primarily on lazi-
92. See Jensen, supra note 2; DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Rice, supra note 33 (discussing premi-
ums paid to shareholders).
93. See, e.g., Round Trips, supra note 26; Beatrice Buy-Out, supra note 26.
94. The argument is reduced to the advantages of reducing the risk of agency unfaithfulness
for some major corporate restructuring during the transition phase, which is not a very satisfying
explanation.
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ness-managers work harder when they are owners-this justification
focuses on the risk preferences of typical managers. Managers are con-
fronted with a high risk business decision that they are unwilling to
take as agents of a public corporation but are willing to take as own-
ers.95 In other words, managers will not accept the risk unless they are
compensated with a larger slice of the return per dollar invested than
they would receive if they undertook the gamble in their current posi-
tions as salaried executives. Almost all management buyouts involve
radical changes in the business. Recapitalizations that double or triple
debt, major adjustments in the management team, the sale of major
assets, or the bust-up of the firm itself carry substantial risks. Buyout
groups demand substantial returns for assuming substantial risks."
Modern finance theory postulates that managers are more risk
averse than most shareholders because managers cannot diversify their
95. Oftentimes this business opportunity may take the form of selling off several divisions of
the firm. The divestment of businesses may be an integral part of the buyout proposal, or it may
be a response to competitive pressures in financing higher bids in an auction contest. See, e.g.,
Buyout of Burlington Industries Inc. May Force Firm to Become Much Smaller, Wall St. J., May
22, 1987, at 6, col. 2. Many companies have been enormously successful in executing a buyout and
financing the transaction through such sales. See Beatrice Buy-Out, supra note 26. This sum-of-
the-parts-greater-than-the-whole result may be a consequence of the failed diversification efforts
of many firms for which their stock prices have been penalized, resulting in substantial profit op-
portunities from removing the misfitting pieces. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 30-35 (stating that
excessive corporate expansion creates profitable divestiture opportunities); Main & Thackray, The
Logic of Restructuring, PLANNING REV. May-June 1987, at 5, 6; Diversification Blues, MERGERS &
AcQUISITIONS, May-June 1987, at 13 (summarizing study by McKinsey & Co. which indicates that
most firms' attempts at diversification by merger are failures); Brooks, Some Concerns Find that
the Push to Diversify Was a Costly Mistake, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1984, at 33, col. 4. Additionally,
undertaking a series of divestitures as a private company does not leave the seller open to hostile
offers as it accumulates cash from the proceeds of the sales of the divisions. In order for managers
to maintain the same degree of safety in a similar sell-off of divisions of a publicly traded corpora-
tion, managers might be forced to resort to erecting various blocking devices of which recent court
decisions have taken a dim view.
96. For a description of several situations in which the risks associated with a highly lever-
aged capital structure have threatened the stability of LBO transactions, see Loomis, supra note
29.
An alternate explanation to the risk/reward trade-off portrays managers as more benevolent.
With so much money at stake, however, one should be immediately skeptical of self-laudatory
claims of benevolence in MBOs; such claims are not often made, but they deserve some attention.
Managers claim that they are reluctant to change so radically the riskiness of the firm without the
explicit, well-educated assent of all the participants. Fairness dictates that those public sharehold-
ers that bought stock before the decision, most likely assuming that the firm would continue to act
in a more routine fashion, should be cashed out at a premium over market and the firm left in the
hands of a sophisticated small group of investors who understand and are explicitly willing to take
the risk of the radical change in the firm. Of course, all shareholders could sell on the announce-
ment of a major business change regardless of a buyout, and in the end the managers best claim is
only the protection of those few shareholders who sit on their hands (not bothering to monitor the
firms' business) unless jolted to attention by a one time premium over market price to get out. But
do such shareholders deserve protection? They have factored the costs of inattention into an equa-
tion that favors other uses of their time.
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investment of human capital in an employing firm; 97 that is, managers
cannot work for a diversified group of twenty firms."8 Moreover, much
of their compensation is firm-specific as well, consisting of stock option
plans and other corporate fringe benefits.9 9 Most managers do not have
enough other investment wealth to diversify adequately their concen-
trated investment in their employing firm. As a consequence, managers
suffer firm-specific risk (unsystematic risk) that other shareholders can
avoid more easily by maintaining a diverse investment portfolio, al-
though shareholders must pay managers to accept such risks. Moreover,
managers, within broad boundaries imposed by the monitoring capabil-
ity of the shareholders, faced with specific business choices will favor
alternatives that sacrifice expected value for less variance in outcome,
to the detriment of the interests of their shareholders. 100 The conflict is
the most pronounced when the choice on the table is dramatic; that is,
when it involves a radical deviation from past business practices. The
choice is a high risk, one-time gamble with high stakes.
How do shareholders encourage their managers to take the high
risk gambles that hold positive expected values? The best choice is a
redivision of the gains from the gamble so that managers get a larger
return per dollar invested. Shareholders get less than they would get if
the managers would take the gamble as salaried employees without a
redivision of the gains, but managers may refuse to do this for the high
risk business decisions. However, if shareholders are willing to accept
some redistribution of gains, they still may get more than they would if
the managers do nothing and the gains are never realized, which is the
more likely scenario for the high risk gambles.10' The redivision of gains
97. For a summary of this position, see Coffee, supra note 10, at 15-23. Of course, this lack
of diversification is exacerbated by stock purchase programs and option plans-and is taken to the
extreme in MBOs.
98. There are a variety of reasons for the development of firm-specific labor investments
(which also explain why firms hire employees rather than use independent contractors for some
functions). One important reason is that many employees are most valuable when they specialize;
that is, they develop firm-specific knowledge on the job. Firm loyalty created by allegiance to one
master often has advantages as well. See generally Jenson & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Mana-
gerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Williamson,
The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. EcoN. LIT. 1537 (1981).
99. See Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & EcoN.
375, 389-90 (1983).
100. See Marcus, Risk Sharing and the Theory of the Firm, 13 BELL J. ECON. 369, 373-75
(1982); Note, The Executive Compensation Contract: Creating Incentives to Reduce Agency
Costs, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1174 (1985).
101. A simple numerical example, which ignores the time value of money and assumes public
shareholders have diversified unsystematic risk out of their portfolios, clarifies the point of redivid-
ing the gains from a radical change in firm's businesses. Managers in a publicly held corporation,
which has one million common shares outstanding each priced at $2, note that a restructuring and
partial liquidation adding substantial debt to the company's capital structure has a 55/45 chance
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can be accomplished in a variety of ways; but management buyouts are
currently a popular method of paying managers specially to accept, and
even to seek out, the risk of major business restructurings, which sug-
gests that buyouts are often the most efficient method of redividing
gains. 02
of making or losing $1 per share. The shareholders' expected value of the restructuring is a posi-
tive, $0.10 per share (55% x $1 minus 45% x $1), and the restructuring should be undertaken
(assuming there are no alternative investments with an equal or greater return which are equally
or less risky). The managers, however, are more risk-averse than the corporation's shareholders
because they are undiversified; their income or wealth is entirely a function of the corporation's
fortunes (assume, for example, that management's salary and bonuses are a function of stock price
with income increasing or decreasing $100,000 for every dollar of increase or decrease in stock
price). If, because of risk aversion, managers attach greater importance to the loss of $100,000 than
they do to a gain of an equal amount (assume that in terms of the current probabilities for success
the loss is viewed subjectively as $125,000) managers will perceive the restructuring differently
than shareholders. When management calculates its private expected value of the restructuring
(with the loss seen as $125,000 and the gain only $100,000) it finds that it is a loss of $1250 (55% x
$100,000 minus 45% x $125,000). Obviously management will not wish to undertake the restruc-
turing. If, however, shareholders could agree to pay managers an additional $10,000 from their
gains if the restructuring succeeds, the expected value for shareholders would still be a positive
$0.095 per share, while the expected value for the management team would be a gain of $4250
(even with the potential loss weighted at $125,000) (55% x $110,000 minus 45% x $125,000). If this
type of gain sharing is allowed to take place, it is much more likely that a transaction that benefits
public shareholders will be undertaken. In many situations there will be a range of side payments
that could be made from shareholders to managers that may leave both groups better off.
102. To continue the example from the previous footnote, the managers offer to buy the
1,000,000 shares held by the public for $2.20 per share, or $0.20 over the current market price.
Assume the managers have aggregate savings of $200,000 to invest in the firm's stock. The financ-
ing for the proposed buyout is to come from unsecured debt in the amount of $2,000,000 (purchase
price of $2,200,000 less a $200,000 equity investment) with interest at 20% annually. After man-
agement has purchased the public's shares, the corporation's debt-to-equity ratio will be much
higher and both positive and negative financial results from the restructuring and partial liquida-
tion will be magnified. If the restructuring succeeds and the value of each share of the firm in-
creased by $10, management now owns a corporation with a value of $3,000,000 ($3, multiplied by
1,000,000 shares). If, at this time, management were to complete the liquidation of the corporation,
the debt of $2,000,000 could be repaid, along with $400,000 interest, leaving the owner-managers
with $600,000. Subtracting their $200,000 equity investment, managers find that the buyout re-
structuring combination gives them a 55% chance of earning a net $400,000. On the negative side,
if the restructuring fails (a 45% chance), managers may now lose their $200,000 equity stake in the
firm. Calculating the expected value of the buyout restructuring transaction we find that manage-
ment expects to earn $130,000 (55% x $400,000 minus 45% x $200,000). By executing the buyout,
however, managers become less diversified and more risk averse. Because of the relative sizes of
the potential gains and losses, managers may more than double the subjective weight attached to
the negative outcome (a failed restructuring with the resulting loss of the $200,000 equity invest-
ment now has a subjective value of a negative $400,000, for example) and still find that they have a
positive expected value ($40,000 in this example). Recall that in the previous note risk aversion
was reflected in a 25% increase in the subjected value of the loss. Even though the managers are
less diversified (they have a greater percentage of their assets invested in the firm after the buyout
than before), and are therefore more risk averse, they will effect the buyout and, through the
private firm, undertake the restructuring. The managers' expected value for the restructuring, even
adjusted for increased risk aversion, is positive. Because most managers are risk averse, and risk
preferences are personal and nonlinear functions, an exact calculation of the risk/reward trade-off
necessary to effect a buyout beneficial to both management and public shareholders cannot be
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In management buyouts top executives get a higher rate of return
and assume a higher risk (they put a higher percentage of their personal
assets at risk in the firm), but presumably the degree of the increase in
return exceeds the degree of the increase in risk for an enhanced ex-
pected value per dollar of investment. Shareholders get some positive
returns for selling the firm to the managers, because the managers will
act and the shareholders assume no risk for the success of the act,
which is better than holding shares in a corporation which does nothing
at all that is risky. In other words, shareholders are better off selling the
firm to their managers and collecting a slice of the gains created in ex-
traordinary transactions than collecting nothing. The argument works
at the margin, creating gains when managers will not make major busi-
ness changes unless offered a better rate of return than what they
would receive as salaried executives for accepting the considerable risk
of some major business transformation. The justification suggests that
management buyouts will depend on the risk preference curves of the
managers, that is, their attitudes toward high risk, high return
opportunities.
This theory of management buyouts also explains why so many re-
capitalizations and other major business restructurings occur in re-
sponse to the threats of third-party hostile tender offers. The
appearance of a hostile bidder, willing to buy the firm and undertake
made a priori by outside observers. See R. HAUGEN, MODERN INVESTMENT THEORY 155-65 (1986)
(discussing the capital asset pricing model and risk return trade-offs faced by investors). We wish
to show only that the benefits to management of executing a buyout may exceed the costs in the
form of increased risk, and that buyout transactions may produce gains for both the buyout group
and the public shareholders.
An MBO may be more efficient than a straight side payment from shareholders to managers
because of the coordination costs for shareholders and, perhaps, in particular situations, because
the institutional investors that purchase the junk bonds sold to finance the restructuring may have
greater risk spreading ability for the radical business change than the shareholders (one can specu-
late about why-did the debtholders deliberately assume the risk that shareholders may not have
contemplated?). Consider the process necessary to effect a side payment. In our example, when the
restructuring and partial liquidation opportunity arises, assume the firm is operating normally
with conventional compensation for its managers. For the shareholders to effect a side payment
that induces managers to undertake the project, the shareholders must inform themselves of the
opportunity a free rider situation, meet and decide on a payment, and negotiate with their manag-
ers over the payment terms. In addition to the practical problems there is the political problem of
convincing shareholders that they should pay their own managers "extra" for exploiting a firm
opportunity. One could counter, perhaps, with an argument that some type of ex ante, contingent
bonus provision in an employment contract would seem to be more efficient because a firm could
thereby avoid shifting risk onto a more risk averse party such as managers. Yet the difficulty of
fine tuning such a general bonus provision to cover optimally particular opportunities may be in-
surmountable. That is, a general bonus provision may encourage too much or too little risk taking
given a specific opportunity. Therefore, as an alternative to a shareholders meeting and discussing
a bonus for a specific opportunity (incurring huge transaction costs), the managers are permitted
to buy the firm.
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some major corporate restructuring that the managers themselves are
reluctant to do, alters the target managers' risk calculations. In this new
environment, if target managers do nothing their firm-specific human
capital may be devastated by their ouster from the corporation. Manag-
ers in this situation have three possible means of protection. First, they
can attempt to thwart a hostile takeover through defensive antitakeover
measures. These measures, however, are currently disfavored by the
courts and in many cases have been of limited effectiveness.0° Second,
managers may attempt a buyout of the company by offering a higher
price to shareholders; in effect, the one-time, high risk gamble has been
forced upon managers by putting their investment in human capital at
stake. Or third, managers may undertake a recapitalization to increase
share prices, while simultaneously thwarting the hostile bidder and pre-
serving their positions." 4 The restructuring alternative carries less risk
than a buyout but still presents a significant change that would be un-
popular with risk averse managers unless they were pressured into the
transaction. The evidence indicates, however, that even the radical
restructurings undertaken by managers in defense of takeovers increase
stock prices.105 Unless target managers are successfully shielding the
market from the true nature of the risk of these restructurings, which is
a doubtful assertion,106 shareholders must not consider the newly as-
sumed risks from the restructurings to be excessive.
III. COURT REGULATION OF MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS
The tarnished reputation of management buyouts makes litigation
over pending deals inevitable and investor groups now routinely expect
and prepare for court tests of their transactions. The courts have ac-
cepted the responsibility for evaluating the fairness of the investor
group's treatment of the public shareholders and have demanded both
proof of procedural fairness in the price negotiations and proof of the
fairness of the price itself.0 7 Courts recognize that the potential for
103. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 2.
'105. The stock market has responded favorably to financial restructurings that are target
managers' defense to unwanted takeovers. Jensen, supra note 2, at 325; see also Magnet, Restruc-
turing Really Works, FORTUNE, Mar. 2, 1987, at 38 (reporting that a study by a Morgan Stanley &
Co. economist concludes that recent restructurings have increased productivity).
106. Moreover, if the argument hinges on managers hiding the true facts from the market,
this is something that target managers presumably could do without a radical business change.
107. This two-pronged analysis stems from the now famous case of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). Commentary on the Weinberger case has been extensive. See, e.g.,
Berger & Allingham, A New Light on Cash-Out Mergers: Weinberger Eclipses Singer, 39 Bus.
LAW. 1 (1983); Herzel & Colling, Establishing Procedural Fairness in Squeeze-Out Mergers After
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 39 Bus. LAW. 1525 (1984) [hereinafter Herzel & Coiling I]; Herzel &
Colling, Squeeze-Out Mergers in Delaware-The Delaware Supreme Court Decision in Weinberger
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abuse comes from the managers' greater access to information concern-
ing the firm, their ability to color the disclosed information, their abil-
ity to time the offer opportunistically, and their dominance in setting
the ultimate price for the buyout.
In recognition of potential abuse on the part of a management
buyout group, and the difficulty of ascertaining a "fair price," courts
have placed greater reliance on the market system's ability to establish
a fair price for the public shareholders.108 Courts have facilitated this
pricing mechanism by attempting to stimulate auctions, or at least
arm's length negotiations, for target corporations through procedural
mechanisms. 10 9 These efforts have focused primarily on striking down
blocking activity that places third-party bidders at a disadvantage to
the management buyout group. With barriers to price competition re-
moved, courts can be more comfortable with even an unopposed man-
v. UOP, Inc., 7 CORP. L. REV. 195 (1984); Payson & Inskip, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.: Its Practical
Significance in the Planning and Defense of Cash-Out Mergers, 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 83 (1983);
Prickett & Hanrahan, Weinberger v. UOP: Delaware's Effort to Preserve a Level Playing Field for
Cash-Out Mergers, 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 59 (1983); Thompson, Squeeze-Out Mergers and the "New"
Appraisal Remedy, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 415 (1984); Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-Out Mergers:
The Promise of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Weiss I]; Weiss,
The Law of Take Out Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase Six, 4 CARDOZO L. REV.
245 (1983); Note, Approval of Take-Out Mergers by Minority Shareholders: From Substantive to
Procedural Fairness, 93 YALE L.J. 1113 (1984).
108. Courts are wary, as well they should be, of examining the intricacies of corporate valua-
tions. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 280 (2d Cir. 1986).
For an overview of some of the complexities involved in corporate valuations, see V. BRUDNEY & M.
CHIRELSTEIN. CORPORATE FINANCE 1-78 (2d ed. 1979). Unfortunately, courts that have ventured into
the valuation quagmire have done so without sufficient navigational tools to find their way to a
financially sound result-often using dated valuation methods or approaches that do not conform
to the norms of the investment community. While the Delaware Supreme Court made a significant
move toward eliminating the rather arbitrary and primitive "Delaware Block" valuation method in
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 708, courts have continued to apply this method for lack of much addi-
tional guidance. Moreover, parties anticipating litigation continue to adopt the "Delaware Block"
method as a safe means of valuation. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 934 (Del.
1985).
While this Article proposes emphasizing procedural aspects to allow as great a role as possible
for the market mechanism to function in setting a transaction price, see infra text accompanying
notes 110-26, it is of even greater importance to encourage the investment banking community to
render unbiased and diligently prepared fairness opinions both to protect shareholders and, so far
as possible, to remove from the courts the burden of actual corporate valuations. This proposal
seeks to create a mechanism to accomplish this objective and to establish the court's role as one of
evaluating the reasonableness and comprehensiveness of a challenged valuation rather than revalu-
ing the company ab initio.
109. In Weinberger the court, in addressing the aspects of procedural fairness, noted among
the relevant factors to consider: the timing of the offer, how the offer was initiated, how it was
structured, how it was negotiated, and how the offer was disclosed. 457 A.2d at 711; cf. Edelman v.
Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc.,
781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986); see also Weiss I, supra note 107, at 49 (arguing that arm's length negotiations may be
most effective means by which to arrive at a fair price).
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agement proposal because one can argue that potential competitors
stayed away simply because they could not meet the management
group's price.
A. Removing Barriers to Price Competition
Management buyout transactions have proven very useful in stimu-
lating auction markets for corporate control under circumstances in
which they might not otherwise have occurred. 110 However, several of
these auction contests have been tainted by a board of directors' at-
tempting to give the buyout group a heavy advantage in the bidding
through lock-up options,""' no-shop clauses,112 break-up fees," 3 and
other defensive devices. Managers claim the favoritism is necessary to
protect non-shareholder interests in the firm or to create the highest
financially secure bid. The second rationale can be either strategic, i.e.,
110. See, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177-79; Morgan Stanley Raises Burlington Bid to $78 a
Share, Topping Hostile Offer, Wall St. J., June 11, 1987, at 4, col. 2; Bilzerian Lifts Pay 'N Pak
Bid To $220 Million, Wall St. J., June 10, 1987, at 18, col. 3; Offer Is Lifted For Burlington Indus-
tries Inc., Wall St. J., May 28, 1987, at 10, col. 1; Fruehauf Gets Sweetened Bid From Edelman,
Wall St. J., June 27, 1986, at 3, col. 4; see also Lowenstein, supra note 32, at 735-39 (noting that
examination of 28 recent management buyout proposals revealed that the target's shareholders
benefited from an auction market for control of the company, and that the benefit increased signif-
icantly with the introduction of multiple bids).
111. Lock-ups are structured most frequently as an option for a bidder to purchase a busi-
ness or division of the target at a bargain price should the option holder fail to acquire the target
as a result of a higher bid by another suitor. Courts have frowned upon these arrangements in
several important instances because they have deemed the option price too low to justify the in-
crease in the favored suitor's bid price, or because the agreements have been undertaken without
knowledge or investigation on the part of the directors as to what an appropriate price should be.
See Hanson Trust PLC, 781 F.2d at 271 (describing situation in which Merrill Lynch/management
group refused to increase buyout bid in the absence of a lock-up option; court held directors did
not undertake adequate investigation of pricing prior to granting option); Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179-
80; see also Note, Lock-Up Options: Towards a State Law Standard, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1068
(1983); Storer Board Accepts $2.51 Billion Bid From Kohlberg Kravis Spurns Comcast, Wall St.
J., July 31, 1985, at 2, col. 3 (lock-up granted to management buyout group despite higher compet-
ing offer).
112. No-shop clauses are agreements entered into between a favored bidder and the target's
board of directors that prohibit the directors from actively seeking other bids as alternatives to the
buyout group. The clauses are usually phrased so as to limit the directors' assistance to alternative
bidders to the minimum necessary to avoid breach of the directors' fiduciary duties to the share-
holders. See, e.g., Edelman, 798 F.2d at 891; Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179. See generally Bryer &
Vlahakis, Enforcement of No-Shop Clauses, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 10, 1984, at 33, col. 6.
113. Break-up fees (also called "goodbye kisses") are fees paid to investment bankers, who
structure and arrange financing for MBOs, upon the failure of the buyout attempt. Buyout partici-
pants urge that these fees are necessary in order to induce investment bankers or leveraged buyout
specialists to undertake the expensive process of putting together a buyout bid when another
suitor is already pursuing the target corporation. See Lowenstein, supra note 32, at 742. While
such break-up fee arrangements are now quite common, some courts have found them abusive
when undertaken in conjunction with other measures designed to assist a management btiyout
group. Edelman, 798 F.2d at 885 (court invalidated break-up fees of $30 million); Revlon, 506 A.2d
at 181 (court invalidated cancellation fee of $25 million).
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the favoring device is necessary to stimulate a bid that otherwise would
not be made, or protective, i.e., the favoring device protects sharehold-
ers against bidders with shaky financial backing.
Observers of tender offers should be immediately suspicious of the
justifications for favoritism by the target's board of directors toward the
management buyout group. If any of these justifications is sincere, one
should expect to see firms favor third-party bidders over management
buyout groups, particularly when a third party promises superior pro-
tection for non-shareholder interests, when incentives are necessary to
stimulate higher third-party bids, or when the management group's fi-
nancing is inferior to the financing of third-party suitors. Yet the man-
agement group is invariably the recipient of the target board's
preferences. Moreover, in several notable instances the board's favorit-
ism has been bestowed upon the buyout group for minimal additional
consideration. As a consequence, most courts have not hesitated to
strike down arrangements that privilege the management buyout
group.114
Support for the courts' skepticism of board behavior that favors
management buyouts goes beyond a disbelief in the sincerity of the jus-
tifications for board favoritism. The arguments, even if sincere, are
problematic. The notion that a management buyout better protects the
interests of non-shareholder constituencies such as labor, creditors, and
local citizenry simply does not comport with the evidence. Management
buyouts are typically the opening salvo in a process of major corporate
restructuring. Creditors dread the heavy debt burden management
114. In Hanson Trust PLC the court granted a preliminary injunction against a lock-up op-
tion that was to entitle the buyout group to buy two highly valued divisions of the target at bar-
gain prices. While the court acknowledged that an inherent part of a lock-up is a bargain price, the
court still found that the directors had breached their fiduciary duties, not by receiving too little
consideration in the form of a higher bid-though the court made it clear that it believed this to
be true-but rather because the directors lacked any adequate basis upon which to conclude one
way or the other that the price was within the range of fair values. Hanson Trust PLC, 781 F.2d at
275, 282-83. The court also concluded that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by using
the lock-up tactic to foreclose further bidding without considering the ramifications of their ac-
tions. Id. In Revlon the target's board of directors ended an auction contest for control between a
hostile bidder and a management buyout group by granting a no-shop clause and a lock-up option
on one of the company's most valuable assets. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176-79. Following the reasoning
of Hanson Trust PLC, the court found that the directors had shut down the auction in return for
only a slight increase in the management buyout groups' bid, and had done so when the board had
reason to believe that the hostile suitor would still top the most recent management buyout bid.
Id. at 183. Edelman follows this same line of reasoning in holding that once the company is up for
sale, directors have a duty to maximize the price paid to shareholders and may not cut short an
auction contest by granting a lock-up without adequate consideration being added to the buyout
groups' bid. Edelman, 798 F.2d at 885. Further, the board granting the lock-up must hold a rea-
sonable belief that no higher bids would otherwise be forthcoming in the absence of the lock-up.
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buyouts create.1 5 Employees are released, 1 6 divisions are sold,117 plants
are relocated, 8 and parts of the firm are taken public again.119 In
short, there are no guarantees that a management buyout will protect
non-shareholders' interests that are not consistent with management's
interests. 120 Moreover, even if non-shareholder interests get protection,
115. See Bleiberg, Bondholders, Unite!: Issuers Are Getting Away with Highway Robbery,
BARRON'S, Nov. 24, 1986, at 9, col. 1; Farrell, Takeovers and Buyouts Clobber Blue-Chip Bond-
holders, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 11, 1985, at 113 (stating that 27% of Moody's 134 downgrades of corpo-
rate bonds in 1985 resulted from takeovers).
116. See Merwin, The Price, FORBES, June 17, 1986, at 106 (indicating that three-quarters of
Thatcher Glass's 4400 employees were fired during course of failed management buyout).
117. See, e.g., Sloan, A Manager Rescues the Money Movers, FORBES, Dec. 17, 1984, at 50,
58; Waldman & Freeman, supra note 43 (buyout group finances transaction by selling the com-
pany's most efficient plant).
118. Sloan, supra note 117, at 58.
119. See Round Trips, supra note 26; Beatrice to Take Its Non-Food Lines Public, Sources
Say, Wall St. J., May 7, 1987, at 37, col. 1.
120. Professor John Coffee supports limited assistance to management buyout groups in
competition with third-party bidders as a method of protecting deferred compensation earned
under an "implicit contract" between the company and the management team. Coffee, supra note
10, at 90-91. Professor Coffee argues that hostile tender offers make possible involuntary wealth
transfers from managers to shareholders. When the new owners release the target corporation's
managers and pay target shareholders a handsome premium for the privilege, the target sharehold-
ers, in essence, are breaching "implicit" compensation agreements under which managers sacrifice
current income for long-term security and deferred payments. Faced with the loss of this deferred
compensation, the target managers will seek to buy control of the firm. Professor Coffee notes that
managers can protect themselves ex ante with a variety of possible contract covenants (e.g., sever-
ance agreements), but suggests that the best protection may be an ex post "settling up" through a
management buyout. Coffee, supra note 10, at 85. He concludes that financial assistance to a man-
agement buyout group, perhaps in the form of break-up fees promised to investment bankers
structuring the deal equal to the allowable severance pay that otherwise could be offered the entire
management team, should not be offensive.
We have several reservations about this argument. First, Professor Coffee seems to overvalue
the efficiency of ex post, open-ended "settling up" procedures as a method of protecting against a
breach of obligation. Ex post "settling up" procedures themselves, if not carefully conditioned ex
ante, provide occasion for opportunistic behavior that may be only marginally related to the
breached obligation. Ex post behavior does not depend on unenforceable ex ante agreements; it
depends solely on the possibilities for opportunistic behavior in the ex post setting. Specifically, all
managers, even those who are not disadvantaged by breaches of implicit compensation agreements,
will take advantage of whatever leniency the law gives them in leveraged buyouts. Even those
managers who have not reached an implicit bargain for deferred compensation (that is, they have
been paid their full value for as long as they have been with the corporation) or those managers
who have adequate severance pay packages will make use of rules favoring a management buyout
if a hostile bidder appears and if they are better off in the future as owner-managers, regardless of
the effect on shareholders. On the other hand, not all managers are included in MBOs and some
managers who are victims of a breach of an implicit contract may not be aided by an MBO (in-
deed, they may be made worse off). In sum, ex post, open-ended "settling up" procedures can be
very crude devices; they can be used by those who are not deserving, and if not controlled ex ante,
they can provide one party an opportunity for gain out of proportion to any losses suffered. Share-
holders, given the choice, would seem to be foolish to prefer such open-ended "settling up" proce-
dures to more concrete severance provisions.
Second, Professor Coffee relies on an impressive empirical study to support his argument that
managers defer compensation early in their careers in hope of collecting large salaries in later
MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS
which constituencies are protected? There are no assurances that one
non-shareholder constituency will not align itself with management to
the disadvantage of other non-shareholder constituencies. In the end,
alternate forms of direct protection-retraining subsidies for unem-
ployed workers, for example-are preferable and more predictable
salves for any economic dislocation caused by corporate restructurings.
The second principal argument for devices that disadvantage third-
party bids is that favoritism towards the management buyout group is
in the best interests of the shareholders. Target boards can block one
bidder when its financing is shaky or assist other bidders who will not
bid at all absent the encouragement. Whether a justification for favorit-
ism based on one bidder's shaky financing ought to be persuasive de-
pends on, first, how often the argument is misused to front simple greed
and, second, whether the shareholders can protect themselves. In-
formed shareholders may choose not to tender their shares if an offer
has poor financial backing, and target managers have the opportunity
to publicize their views on the financing behind any of the bids. More-
over, shareholders can sue after the fact if a tender offer promises more
value than it delivers.
Furthermore, the strength of a justification for blocking one bidder
or assisting another as a strategic measure to stimulate an auction de-
pends on whether such strategies succeed more often than they fail,
which is the frequency of error given conscientious managers. 2' Argua-
years. Assuming this to be true, however, there are two explanations: The first is offered by Profes-
sor Coffee, that managers have a reasonable expectation for claiming deferred income. The second
explanation is, we submit, more realistic. Young managers accept undercompensation because they
are buying into a form of lottery. They realize that they will not all become CEOs, executive vice-
presidents and the like, and that some will not be able to cash-in their tickets. But the prospect of
a huge payoff itself has value, and young managers are willing to exchange some current salary for
it. If they lose, it is not a breach of a promise but rather the harsh result of the employment
lottery. At most, one could argue that the terms of the lottery may be changed by a takeover or
MBO, but this assumes that managers "buy" their tickets with no appreciation of the pace of
change in management theory in American business. In the history of American business this
year's optimal management structure is last year's stifling, inefficient bureaucracy; to expect these
rules of promotion to remain fixed over time is foolhardy.
121. Ideally, managers will use the assistance of a friendly buyout group, or a blocking mech-
anism, to slow a hostile suitor and gather negotiating strength necessary to stimulate a higher bid
for the company. Such intervention by managers has historically proven beneficial to shareholders
in the form of higher premiums paid upon an actual takeover. However, the full abnormal returns
earned by shareholders hold only through the realization of failure if an offer is unsuccessful and
dissipates thereafter. If target management successfully deflects all offers for the firm-whether
hostile or friendly-shareholders will lose the premium that had attached to the target's stock
price upon announcement of a bid for the company. Bradley, Desai & Kim, The Rationale Behind
Interfirm Tender Offers: Information or Synergy, 11 J. FIN. EcoN. 183, 189-98 (1983) (noting that
stock returns to its pre-offer price within two years after a tender offer has been defeated); cf.
Comment & Jarrell, Two-Tier Tender Offers: The Imprisonment of the Free-Riding Shareholder 2
(Mar. 1, 1986) (unpublished manuscript) (in interpreting SEC data, authors found premiums in
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bly, lock-ups and leg-ups and the like can induce higher bids if these
devices are offered at opportune moments. These moments occur when
a potential bidder balks because it must incur additional costs before it
can decide whether to bid, and the probability of getting outbid is high.
In theory, by favoring the reluctant bidder, the seller can reduce the
new, would-be bidder's risk of losing the costs associated with making
the bid, which induces the new bidder to make an offer for the target
and perhaps participate in a potential auction. 122 The strategy has the
most merit when a potential bidder has not yet entered a bid at all,
rather than when all bidders are in the contest and the bidding has
stopped. It is more likely that in the latter case the costs are "sunk,' 123
and the bidder needs no more encouragement to bid because it has sim-
ply reached its reservation price. 24 Thus, if there are no net transaction
costs to further bidding-and the possibility of making profits on stock
bought in anticipation of the tender offer can make this true for all the
bidders-then the strategy of favoring any one bidder is a waste of
resources.
Even in situations that might otherwise call for management inter-
vention, the strategy of blocking or assisting bidders in order to stimu-
late an auction still has three substantial drawbacks. First, the target
board must make an accurate assessment of the willingness of the ex-
isting high bidder to rebid. The most powerful incentive to bid is a total
lock-out of any other bidders because this, in essence, fixes the price of
winning. Before the target board can make a lock-out offer, however,
the board must be convinced that no other bidder is willing to outbid
excess of 50% for negotiated offers and even higher premiums for contested offers); Jensen &
Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 15-16
(1983) (summarizing studies). Thus, from the shareholders' viewpoint, resistance by management
should be favored so long as managers are not successful, in defeating the bid entirely; although if a
leveraged recapitalization is the result of a defeated bid, shareholders may also fare well. See supra
note 2.
122. See Carney, Two-Tier Tender Offers and Shark Repellents, 4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 48,
50 (1986) (discussing reluctance of the second bidder to incur costs).
123. Once costs associated with an investment have been incurred, they are "sunk" and are
no longer relevant to a forward looking investment decision. For example, if Company X spends
$10 gathering information to help it decide whether it should bid to buy Company Y, and finds
that its gains from acquiring Company Y will be only $5, it should not net the informational costs
against the potential gain and reject the investment. The information costs have been incurred and
are now irrelevant. As long as the acquisition will produce positive gains (disregarding costs of
capital and other financing considerations), Company X should purchase Company Y. Likewise,
once a bidder has entered into an auction contest to buy another company by making an initial
bid, most of its information gathering costs are sunk costs, and the incremental costs of raising its
bid-payments directly to shareholders plus future investment banking and legal fees-are the
only costs relevant in determining whether to continue in the contest for control.
124. See Oesterle I, supra note 11, at 152.
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the reluctant bidder's new offer.12 5 Moreover, the need for a lock-up
occurs only if the reluctant bidder believes it will be outbid, and thus
the target board and the reluctant bidder must be in disagreement over
the willingness of the current high bidder to rebid. Second, the availa-
bility of devices that favor bidders encourages strategic bluffing on the
part of all bidders, which places a premium on the board's ability to
discriminate between fact and fiction.126 A second bidder willing to bid
should always attempt to play the role of the reluctant bidder to gain
assistance in the auction. And third, if boards are able to use lock-ups
and leg-ups to encourage second bidders, the prospect of encountering
these devices may discourage first bidders as well. First bidders also
must decide whether to invest in discovering and evaluating takeover
candidates, and they may underinvest if there is the threat that target
boards will give significant aid to potential competitors; an auction may
mean that the first bidder would never recoup its initial investment
costs.
In sum, the courts appear to have adopted a sensible approach to-
wards management buyouts. They appreciate the difficulty of discrimi-
nating between a bidding strategy sincerely aimed at upping the bid by
favoring a reluctant bidder and a bidding strategy that amounts merely
to self-serving favoritism. Courts also appreciate the likelihood that
even a sincere board frequently will misplay given the opportunity.
B. The Independent Negotiating Committee
If competing bids are not present then the board of the corporation
whose management has proposed a buyout has more discretion in ap-
proving the transaction. In most firms the management team holds a
sizable position on the corporation's board of directors, which means
that uncontested management buyout transactions, along with more
traditional cash-out mergers, always raise a significant possibility for
improper self-dealing on the part of management. 27 In these circum-
125. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 275, 282-83 (2d Cir.
1986) (holding that plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of proving that the target board had breached
its duty of care both by failing in its duty to investigate the pricing of the lock-up option and by
using the lock-up option to foreclose additional bidding); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
126. See Oesterle I, supra note 11, at 152.
127. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme Court set
forth the foundation for evaluating transactions in which directors' judgment may be impaired by
divided loyalties:
When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required
to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bar-
gain. The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both
sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass
the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.
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stances the courts have fashioned an important role for the "disinter-
ested outside director."' 28
Initially, courts were willing to certify management buyouts with a
showing that the transaction was approved by a board consisting of a
majority of "disinterested outside directors" or through the establish-
ment of an independent negotiating committee to act exclusively on be-
half of the public shareholders. 2 ' While in practice little difference may
exist between the deliberations of outside directors and those of an in-
dependent negotiating committee, the independent committee can have
important advantages in minimizing the influence of buyout group par-
ticipants by creating a formal barrier between full board deliberations
and committee deliberations. Placing squarely on the shoulders of com-
mittee members the responsibility for the decision of whether to ap-
prove a buyout may also minimize the committee's deference to the
opinions and expertise of inside directors. Furthermore, establishing an
independent committee may encourage committee members to retain
independent investment and legal counsel. Independent negotiating
committees are not a panacea, however, and may even serve sharehold-
ers far worse than more informal decisions by outside directors if the
formation of a committee causes courts to relax their scrutiny of com-
mittee decisions.
While the independent negotiating committee as currently envi-
sioned by the courts is a positive development, its employment has
lacked substance in some transactions that recently have made their
way to court. 30 By their very nature, independent committees, as cur-
rently constructed, are probably not well suited to put up a tough fight
for shareholder interests. The outside directors who comprise the com-
mittee are invariably friends of the insider directors, and the committee
members have very little to gain from fighting hard for a higher buyout
Id. at 710 (citations omitted).
128. A comparable role for outside directors exists when management is accused of using
takeover defenses as entrenchment devices. Courts look to the deliberations of the board of direc-
tors in approving the defense when evaluating the extent of management's conflicting interests.
See, e.g., Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1356 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
129. Like the two-pronged test of the fairness of management buyouts, much of the signifi-
cance that attaches to independent negotiating committees can be traced to the Delaware Supreme
Court's opinion in Weinberger and the subsequent analysis by commentators. In the course of
finding that a majority shareholder had not dealt fairly with the minority shareholders in a cash-
out merger, the court noted in dicta that "[a]lthough perfection is not possible, or expected, the
result here could have been entirely different if UOP had appointed an independent negotiating
committee of its outside directors." 457 A.2d at 709 n.7. For a discussion of the role of the inde-
pendent negotiating committee and suggestions for refining the composition of such committees
see infra notes 165-81 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986).
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price.131 Furthermore, in some of the closer cases involving management
buyouts, it is entirely uncertain exactly what weight the presence of the
currently formulated negotiating committees will carry, if any, beyond a
prima facie meeting of the preliminary duty of good faith and reasona-
ble investigation. 13 2
Courts should look for five specific events in their evaluation of the
performance of any independent committee of outside directors: first,
the absence of blocking behavior;133 second, the willingness of the com-
mittee to solicit outside bids; third, the committee's reliance on expert
advice; fourth, the committee's access to all information material to a
proper valuation of the corporation; and fifth, evidence of serious delib-
erations by the independent committee. 3 4
131. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1106 (Del. 1985) (questioning
"quick surrender" by special committee when price was at low end of range advised as fair by
separately retained investment advisors); cf. Herzel & Coling I, supra note 107, at 1534-37; Weiss
I, supra note 107, at 50-53.
132. Compare Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7 and Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1106 n.7 with Ro-
senblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 938 n.7 (Del. 1985) (court oddly referred to a three member
team that included two members of management as an "independent bargaining structure" in con-
text of a cash-out merger and added that "such a committee is not essential to a finding of
fairness").
133. See supra notes 110-26 and accompanying text.
134. This monitoring can be overdone, however, encouraging committee meetings to become
choreographed shibboleths. In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), a class action
brought by shareholders of the target of a cash-out merger, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
the deliberations of directors were not adequate to inform them of the merits of the transaction
that they subsequently approved. The directors' judgment was not wrong; rather it just was not
exercised, and thus, the court held the directors personally liable to the shareholders. The direc-
tors were not afforded the protections of the business judgment rule because their decision was
held to be "not the product of an informed business judgment." Id. at 864. While the facts of the
case are not entirely clear, the court's interpretation and holding put a premium on formalism in
the boardroom. See Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van
Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAw. 1 (1985) (listing the do's and don'ts for directors in evaluating proposed
control transactions as implied by the Van Gorkom opinion). There should not be a magical num-
ber of hours directors must spend in deliberations nor a specific minimum quantity of documents
they must read. Courts need to keep in mind that the decision to act without information is itself a
business decision that involves balancing costs and benefits. Overly rigid criteria, like time spent in
meetings, do not aid analysis and create dysfunctional behavior. On the other hand, the case does
much to encourage directors to obtain fairness opinions from independent financial advisors (un-
fortunately the encouragement comes in the form of an in terrorem threat of personal liability to
directors). See Trans Union Corp.'s Ex-directors to Settle Suit for $23.5 Million, Wall St. J., Aug.
2, 1985, at 18, col. 3.
An article by Professor Daniel Fischel termed the case "one of the worst decisions in the
history of corporate law." Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40
Bus. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985). The article makes light of the one positive effect the case may have:
"Firms will have no difficulty finding an 'expert' who is willing to state that a price at a significant
premium over the market price in an arm's-length transaction is 'fair.' (I wish someone would pay
me several hundred thousand dollars to state that $55 is greater than $35.)". Id. at 1453; see also
Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAW.
1187 (1986). Some value may be salvaged from the case, however, if, through the use of specially
formulated negotiating committees and clearer standards of accountability for investment advisors,
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C. The Management Buyout Group's Obligation to Disclose its
Reservation Price
In Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.," 5 a bidding
war broke out between the hostile suitor, Pantry Pride, and a buyout
group consisting of Revlon management and Forstmann Little & Co.
Each bidder raised its offer to shareholders three times before the court
ended the bidding war. With each subsequent bid, the buyout group
justified its offer as "fair" to the shareholders. This is not uncommon. 36
The buyout group probably was following the normal bargaining proce-
dure of not putting its reservation price on the table so that it could
maximize its profits by purchasing the company as cheaply as possi-
ble.13 7 Thus the buyout group walks the line between making offers that
are "fair," while not revealing what it ultimately is willing to pay.
Shareholders, of course, demand that their managers disclose their ulti-
mate valuation of the company; from the shareholders' perspective, the
valuation is inside infoimation, gathered from superior access to corpo-
rate data. 8"
the fairness opinions now so essential to such transactions can be given more substance than they
currently carry.
135. 506 A.2d 173, 177-78 (Del. 1986).
136. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986); Hanson Trust PLC
v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d. 264 (2d Cir. 1986); see also supra note 60 (regarding the
bidding for Viacom International, Inc.). In the buyout of National Gypsum, Inc., management's
initial offer was for $1.1 billion-30% above the market price. Wickes countered the management
bid with its own offer of $1.46 billion. Just as quickly, however, management topped the Wickes
price with a bid of $1.64 billion-a 50% increase over its original bid. Gogel, supra note 2, at 31. If
management can easily raise its bid for a billion dollar company by 50%, it is very difficult to see
how the original bid could have been "fair" to shareholders.
137. The bids of other parties can also change the buyout group's reservation price-the
buyout group may increase its estimate of the firm's value after they know why others think it is
valuable.
138. The general rule is that whenever a corporation or its insiders buy stock from the firm's
shareholders, the buyers must disclose to the sellers all information on the firm that a reasonable
investor would view as significant in his deliberations. See TSC Indus., Inc., v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438 (1976) (defining materiality under proxy disclosure requirements). But see Mutual Shares
Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that in a cash tender offer an outside
bidder did not have to disclose to other stock purchasers facts it deduced from published informa-
tion about the target and its plans for using the target's resources). One could argue, perhaps, that
reservation prices are simply predictions of a firm's future performance and, as such, are more
misleading than helpful. The SEC's position on the disclosure of "soft" information and projec-
tions has changed substantially in the last ten years. Compare Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft
Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 254 (1972) (stating that the SEC's position is that
projections and other soft information are likely to mislead investors) and Mann, Prospectuses:
Unreadable or Just Unread?-A Proposal to Reexamine Policies Against Permitting Projections,
40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 222 (1971) with Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic
Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5,992, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q
81,756 (Nov. 7, 1978), rescinded in Sec. Act Release No. 33-6384 (March 3, 1982) (guidelines for
disclosure of projections); Note, The SEC Safe Harbor for Forecasts-A Step in the Right Direc-
tion?, 1980 DuKE L.J. 607; see also Note, Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Projections and the
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The issue is interesting because it tests the limits of the definition
of inside information. The traditional generic descriptions of the term,
based on the source of the information and whether or not the informa-
tion is "material," are not very satisfying. Protecting reservation prices
from disclosure, for example, with a claim that they are not "material"
to investors does, at minimum, a gross injustice to common sense and
the English Language: Yet if courts hold that shareholders are entitled
to the management group's reservation price, two undesirable side ef-
fects will result. First, management groups will lose much of their in-
centive to discover and fund management buyout opportunities if they
can make only break-even bids for a firm. As a consequence, sharehold-
ers will lose the benefits of selling to management groups or to the
other bidders that appear in response to a management buyout. Second,
management groups will have a heavy incentive to cheat; that is, to find
ways of creating and supporting false reservation price positions with
legitimizing documentation and other evidence. One wonders about the
power of courts to wander through these carefully constructed mazes.
On the other hand, the management group should not be able to
shield certain information that is clearly material to the size of the
management group's bid, such as new corporate advances in technology,
growth in market share, or other material developments. The corpora-
tion's shareholders or their representatives are commonly understood to
have a right to know this kind of information and to share in the profits
this information generates. Between not disclosing a reservation price
and disclosing hard information are some very difficult questions. For
instance, does the management group have to disclose soft, buyer-spe-
cific information such as its predictions of the firm's earnings potential
or its estimates of asset values? One could argue that all management
analysis, including an actual reservation price, should be disclosed, or,
on the other hand, that standards should be set that create larger areas
of privileged information. For example, two supportable positions are:
(1) that any management analysis of the firm as a publicly held corpo-
ration should be disclosed, while any management analysis of the firm
as restructured after the buyout (the buyout plans) is privileged; or (2)
that all management analysis is privileged. Whatever standard is cho-
Goals of Securities Regulation, 81 COLUM. L. Rev. 1525 (1981). Securities Act Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. §
230.175 (1987), and Exchange Act Rule 3b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1987), create a safe harbor for
forward looking statements if the issuer makes the statement in good faith and with a reasonable
basis. Projections that are overly optimistic still will trigger liability, however. See, e.g., Eisenberg
v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); Goldman v. Belden, 754
F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985). Yet the argument that the information is a possibly misleading prediction
overlooks the real value of a reservation price. The fact that the bidder has established a firm
reservation price usually is more important to sellers than the predictions inherent in the price.
The seller, knowing the buyer's reservation price, can extract maximum value.
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sen, its application to specific facts will be inherently difficult.
The conceptual difficulties of defining disclosure obligations in
many management buyouts stems from their hybrid nature; a manage-
ment buyout has some of the characteristics of an issuer repurchase arid
an outside bid. In issuer repurchases, the consensus seems to be that
there are heavy disclosure obligations because the issuer should not be
able to strike opportunistic deals with its own shareholders, that is,
deals that take advantage of asymmetric information about the firm it-
self. In bids by outside parties, however, the disclosure obligations are
less demanding, although there is no consensus on how much less de-
manding. The bidder has spent funds to acquire valuable information,
information that the sellers themselves often could also acquire (as
shareholders or through their agents, the firm managers). To deprive
the bidder of the fruits of its efforts would deter bidders from investing
in the collection of information on potential targets and reduce the
number of beneficial buyouts. A management buyout, however, has ele-
ments of both an issuer repurchase, because members of the buyout
group are fiduciaries and have superior access to firm information as a
result of their privileged position, and an outside bid, because the
buyout group is a new entity purchasing control of the firm, often in
competition with other bidders and, perhaps, even an existing control
group. The legal history of the SEC's treatment of issuer repurchases
and tender offers by outside bidders illustrates a hazy, and intermittent
recognition of management buyouts' relationship to the basic concep-
tual dichotomy.
The SEC, sensitive to the problems of defining proper disclosures
in issuer repurchases, attempted both in 1975 and 1977 to assume the
authority to prohibit going private transactions through issuer or issuer
affiliate repurchases that the SEC deemed "unfair. '" 39 Faced with criti-
cism that the Commission had no authority to promulgate such a rule,
the SEC adopted in 1979 a substitute rule, Rule 13e-3, that specifically
requires the disclosure of itemized information and generally requires
the disclosure of all material inside information.140 The Rule applies to
issuer or issuer affiliate repurchases if the effect of the repurchase is to
eliminate a firm's reporting obligations under the 1934 Act. The rule
139. Notice of Public Fact-Finding Investigation and Rulemaking Proceeding in Matter of
"Going Private" Transactions by Public Companies and Their Affiliates, Exchange Act Release
No. 11,231, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 80,104 (Feb. 6, 1975); Going
Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Exchange Act Release No. 14,185,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q 81,366 (Nov. 17, 1977).
140. Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1987); Schedule 13E-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100
(1987). Suspension of Duty to File Reports upon Termination of Registration, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 16,078, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,168 (Aug. 2, 1979).
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also requires, for example, the issuer/purchaser or buyout group to state
whether it believes the transaction to be "fair or unfair." ' In its in-
structions on substantive fairness, the rule lists several factors as rele-
vant to determining whether the transaction price is fair, although the
rule notes that the importance of these factors will vary with the partic-
ular transaction. The list includes the following factors: Current market
prices, historical market prices, net book value, going concern value, liq-
uidation value, price paid by managers in recent stock purchases, opin-
ions or appraisals by outside parties, and recent offers by other buyers.
A reading of the list permits the interpretation used by most invest-
ment bankers, which is that a "fair price" does not necessarily have to
be the bottom line price of the buyout group. Moreover, there is no
requirement that a fair price be "close" to the bottom line price.
Rule 13e-3 may have a limited application to management buyouts,
however. The Rule applies only to issuer repurchases or repurchases by
an "affiliate" of the issuer.4 2 An affiliate is a person who "controls, is
controlled by, or under common control" with the issuer.143 The SEC
has noted that determinations of control are a question of fact and are
"not limited to control obtained through ownership of equity securi-
ties."'14 4 Presumably, a CEO leading a management buyout group would
qualify the group as an affiliate. If less powerful members of the man-
agement team participate in the buyout without the CEO, or the CEO
is not a major participant in the buyout group, the group may not have
the status of an affiliate. 1 5 Absent affiliate status, only in specialized
cases, such as an asset sale followed by an issuer repurchase of all of its
shares using the proceeds of the sale, will management buyouts by such
groups require the filing of a Schedule 13E-3.1'46
141. Schedule 13E-3, Item 8(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1987); see Comment, Regulating
Going Private Transactions: SEC Rule 13e-3, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1980). Comment, Rule 13e-3
and the Going Private Dilemma: The SEC's Quest for a Substantive Fairness Doctrine, 58 WASH.
U.LQ. 883 (1980).
142. Rule 13e-3(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1987).
143. Rule 13e-3(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1987). The Rule also only applies to companies
that report under §§ 12 or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act. Repurchases by issuers and
affiliates can also raise market manipulation problems under §§ 9 and 10 of the Exchange Act.
Rule 10b-18 provides a safe harbor from the antimanipulation rules depending on trading volume
and price.
144. Going Private Transactions by Public Companies of Their Affiliates, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 6101, Investment Co. Act No. 10806, Exchange Act No. 16076 (Aug. 2, 1979) (LEXIS,
Fed Sec library, release file).
145. For example, after stating in the Release that affiliates of the seller can become affiliates
of the purchaser through means other than equity ownership in multi-step asset sale transactions,
the SEC notes, however, that it "would not view a person as an affiliate of the purchaser soley
because such person enters into or agrees to enter into a reasonable and customary employment
agreement or is elected . . . as an executive officer or director of the purchaser." Id. at n.6.
146. Id.
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If the buyout is structured as a tender offer, however, the buyout
group must comply with Rule 14d-1 and file a Schedule 14D-1, 147 if it is
not an affiliate, or must comply with Rule 13e-4 and file a Schedule
13E-4 (in addition to a Schedule 13E-3) if it is an affiliate.14 8 In sum,
there are no specific disclosure schedules for management buyouts by
nonaffiliates that do not involve a tender offer. Moreover, management
buyouts by nonaffiliates that do involve tender offers are subject to the
same specific disclosure schedules as tender offers by third-party bid-
ders. Since the possibility of abuse of insider information and position
by management buyout goups that are not technically "affiliates," al-
though slightly less severe on average, approaches the potential
problems in issuer repurchases, one would expect the SEC to give
managment buyouts by nonaffiliates more individualized attention.
In any event, the major differences between Schedules 13E-3 for
issuer repurchases and Schedule 14D-1 for third-party tender offers is
in items 8 and 9 of Schedule 13E-3; these items have no specific corre-
sponding disclosure requirements in the Schedule 14D-1. Item 8 of
Schedule 13E-3 requires a statement on the fairness of the transaction
with supporting rationale and includes a reference to item 9 that re-
quires the disclosure of all reports or appraisals from outside parties
"materially relating" to the fairness of the offer. In Schedule 13E-3, the
issuer, as a fiduciary to the selling shareholders, must, in essence, dis-
close all its valuation information while outside bidders, using Schedule
14D-1, can presumably be more secretive. The courts, however, may not
be sensitive to the difference, and may apply the same definition of
"material" to both situations. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, for example, has held that asset appraisals commis-
sioned by an outside bidder should be disclosed, if the appraisals are
made by unbiased experts after a thorough investigation.1 49 If there is a
147. Rule 14d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14-1 (1987); Rule 14d-100, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1987)
(Schedule 14D-1).
148. Rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1987); Rule 13e-101, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-101 (1987)
(Schedule 13E-4). If the issuer is responding to a third-party tender offer with a share repurchase
offer, then Rule 13e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1 (1987), also applies.
149. In the context of corporate control transactions regulated under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, fair market value of assets may be a type of soft information that buyers must dis-
close. Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., Inc., 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984) (Williams Act section 14(e)
requires disclosure of asset valuations made by experts if material; more informal valuations by
non-experts are not material and need not be disclosed). But see Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244,
253 (6th Cir. 1985) (asset appraisals need not be disclosed by bidders even though included in a
Schedule 13E-3 filing-the court did not decide, however, whether the same reports had to be
disclosed in the Schedule 13E-3); Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986) (highly speculative valuations need not be disclosed by target in
Schedule 19D-9 filing).
The argument that these nonexpert appraisals or overly "speculative" expert appraisals are
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real difference in the schedules, however, management buyouts may en-
joy the luxury of the more lenient standard in Schedule 14D-1, depend-
ing on the composition of the buyout group and the structure of the
transaction.
Neither a judicial approach, based on a unitary definition of "mate-
rial" in all control contests, nor the SEC's approach, placing emphasis
on control of the firm by the dominant members of the buyout group, is
very satisfying. To the extent that a management buyout group acts on
inside information and without serious intervention by nonparticipating
managers or directors on behalf of the firm's shareholders, the buyout
poses the same dangers as a large issuer repurchase of shares. If the
buyout group acts largely on public information and is contested vigor-
ously by a group of outside directors acting on behalf of shareholders,
the buyout resembles a third-party offer. The SEC, and the courts,
should focus on the specific character of the buyout process before de-
ciding which disclosure obligations to apply to the particular transac-
tion. There are many indications that the present disclosure tools are
too crude. What follows is a discussion of identifying characteristics for
buyouts that should be accompanied by disclosures under an issuer re-
purchase standard as opposed to a third-party tender offer standard. 5 '
IV. BETTER METHODS OF PROTECTING TARGET SHAREHOLDERS
A. Increasing the Accountability of Investment Advisors
The weak link in the protections afforded shareholders in manage-
ment buyouts is the misuse of fairness opinions from investment advi-
sors. The buyout group has an obvious interest in legitimizing low bids
not material is unconvincing; reasonable investors would enjoy knowing about the appraisals in
each case-both because of the informational value of the appraisals and because inside managers
also have access to and may be relying on such appraisals. The courts seem enamored not with
materiality but with the likelihood that investors will misunderstand and misuse the soft data
disclosed. This explains why "informal" or "speculative" appraisals are considered suspect. The
courts have not explained, however, why investors cannot be trusted to look out for their own
interests and appropriately discount the more questionable appraisals.
More important, however, is that courts have missed the issue. Required disclosure of all for-
mal detailed studies by experts commissioned by the outside bidder gives shareholders the value of
the studies for free at the bidder's expense. The bidder will cease commissioning formal studies
that calculate reservation prices in favor of informal, oral opinions and will instead commission
general "fairness" studies based upon some generic concept of value when the transaction is finally
brought before the shareholders. These latter studies have value to the buyout group in that they
satisfy SEC rules and help convince shareholders that they should sell. Indeed, this accurately
describes current practice.
150. In fairness, it should be noted that some buyout groups may file both 13E-3 and 14D-1
schedules to avoid potential liability from making an improper choice between the two disclosure
schedules.
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as fair bids and will shop for formal letters of support from accommo-
dating investment advisors.1 51 Investment advisors, interested in fees
that are often contingent on the success of the buyout,152 compete with
each other to satisfy their clients, the investor group. As a consequence,
the fairness letters do not protect shareholders from overreaching by
their managers; indeed, the fairness letters may be part of the fraud.
Moreover, the harm goes beyond affirmative fraud, because sharehold-
ers also lose their single most important protection: access to honest
and fully informed valuations of the corporation by reputable experts.
The value of a diligently prepared fairness opinion goes beyond good
advice on price; a conscientious expert will demand and analyze the
kind of information it knows is material to a proper valuation. There-
fore, the independent expert will act as an investigating agent who
makes it more difficult for managers to conceal material inside informa-
tion that may underlie the management group's offer.
Before discussing how fairness opinions should be used in manage-
ment buyouts, there is an initial question of whether the market will
itself negate the importance of misleading investment opinions solicited
by management groups. One could argue that if management convinces
unsophisticated shareholders to undervalue their shares in a buyout,
two types of well-informed investors will appear. First, arbitrageurs,
who profit from constant market vigilance, will appear and take posi-
tions in the stock anticipating a more active and more lucrative negotia-
tion with the buyout group. The unsophisticated shareholders enjoy the
151. Fairness opinions can provide both a back end and a front end rationalization for self-
serving boards of directors. At the front end, the board can use a favorable opinion to convince
shareholders that the leveraged buyout offer is reasonable. At the back end, the board can use the
fairness opinion to defend shareholder lawsuits, relying on statutory language of the type con-
tained in most corporate codes that shield directors and officers from liability when they reasona-
bly rely on expert opinions. The provision in Tentative Draft No. 4 of the American Law
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations is illustrative:
§ 4.02. Reliance on Directors, Officers, Employees, Experts, and Other Persons
In performing his duty and functions, a director or officer who acts in good faith, and
reasonably believes that his reliance is warranted, is entitled to rely on information, opinions,
reports, statements (including financial statements and other financial data), and decisions,
judgments, or performance .. prepared, presented, made, or performed by:
(b) Legal counsel, public accountants, engineers, or other persons whom the director or
officer reasonably believes merit confidence.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 76-77 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
Apr. 12, 1985). The defense of reliance on an expert is not absolute, but it is strong evidence that
the board acted reasonably. Cf. Longstreth, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a Defense to Securi-
ties Law Violations, 37 Bus. LAW. 1185, 1187 (1982); Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a
Defense in Corporate and Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1976). Presumably, those direc-
tors who affirm a leveraged buyout offer are entitled to the protections of the statute, but those
officers and directors who are participants in the LBO are not.
152. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 24.
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price increase created by the arbitrageurs' purchasing activity and,
therefore, are relatively protected from management fraud. Second,
other buyers will appear to compete with the management group in an
auction for control of the firm. The auction will drive the sale price to
appropriate levels regardless of the misleading fairness opinion. The ar-
gument assumes, however, that arbitrageurs and other potential pur-
chasers can create accurate valuation reports on their own, which in
turn assumes that they have access to all material information on the
worth of the firm at the time of the buyout.153 Since managers who are
members of the buyout group have a substantial interest in blocking
others from obtaining accurate valuation information, such an assump-
tion is likely to be incorrect. Important is the recognition, however, that
normal market activity can be a mechanism for protecting shareholders
that supplements other more formal devices like independent negotiat-
ing committees.
In sum, the cornerstone of procedural fairness and price fairness in
management buyouts is honest, informed, and complete15 4 fairness
opinions. If all management buyouts must be accompanied by honest,
informed, and complete fairness opinions, the following developments
will results: Arbitrageurs and potential alternate purchasers will have
the data to form their own assessments of the company's stock-even if
they reach different conclusions; independent committees, if formed,
will better represent the interests of the shareholders; and finally, man-
agers in the buyout group will be subject to a higher level of accounta-
bility, even absent an independent negotiating committee.
To insure procedural and price fairness in management buyouts, all
buyout proposals should be accompanied by at least one fairness opin-
ion, drafted by reputable financial advisors who are paid without re-
spect to the success of the buyout and who have no financial stake in
the buyout itself. The opinion should contain not only a price evalua-
153. As the pricing of takeover bids and MBOs has become more competitive, there have
been increasing calls from bidders to provide equal information to all serious offerors. A bidder
may offer one price if no nonpublic information is provided, that is, the offer is based only on
publicly disclosed financial reports, and a higher price if the target opens its books to inspection by
the bidder and provides more detailed information not previously disclosed to the public. See, e.g.,
Gibson & Kotlowvitz, Jacobs's Minstar Proposes to Purchase Borg-Warner for as Much as $3.8
Billion, Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 1986, at 2, col. 3 (indicating that tender offer price level contingent on
target showing bidder accounting information).
154. "Complete" in this context means that management must not only make an offer judged
"fair" by its investment bankers, but must also disclose the information underlying the opinion
and the circumstances leading up to the rendering of the opinion. See infra notes 155-69 and
accompanying text; see also Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 268-69 (3d Cir.)
(investment bankers failed to disclose conflict of interest in rendering fairness opinion), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787, 791-93
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (investment bankers used only data supplied by management).
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tion but also a detailed explanation of the data and assumptions behind
the estimate, as well as the methodology employed.155 Since there is the
danger that fairness opinions can be so general and so qualified that
they convey no information (i.e., "one could find a fair price between
five and one hundred dollars per share depending on one's view"), the
drafters of the opinion should be pushed ultimately to a "yes" or "no"l
recommendation on any one price. 156 Finally, the opinion should be
made public a week or so in advance of the commencement of the man-
agement buyout tender offer so that the firm's shareholders and other
potential bidders have time to digest and respond to the information.
To insure that the fairness opinion is legitimate, the drafters of the
opinion should be liable to the corporation, as fiduciaries, for any opin-
ion that is drafted under a conflict of interest 5 7 or without adequate
investigation or thought."" The creation of a fiduciary obligation (to
155. In a competitive market the underlying data for the evaluation may be much more im-
portant than the rendering of a single price figure as the valuation process can be extraordinarily
complex and very subjective. See, e.g., Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983
AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 875, 890-93 (discussing complexities of the valuation process). Accordingly,
two or more investment advisors, working diligently and in good faith, can arrive at quite different
valuations for a corporation. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264,
271 (2d Cir. 1986). It is thus of primary importance to alternate bidders, shareholders, and courts
if called upon, to work with as equal as possible financial statements and reports to set prices or to
evaluate diligence and fairness. Cf. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
184 (Del. 1986). Indeed, much of the controversy in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983), stemmed from an internal study, which found that a price of up to $24 in a cash-out of the
minority shareholders would be a good investment for the majority, that was not disclosed to di-
rectors who approved a $21 cash-out price. Id. at 709.
156. This recognizes, however, that liability should attach only for those opinions that are
found to be flawed for lack of comprehensiveness or unsound methodology. Investment bankers
would be given some leeway around any one price affirmation as a consequence of the difficulty in
arriving at a single price for a target corporation, so long as a showing of reasonable investigation
into the facts is made and a sound methodology is employed. For a description of some of the
complexities in performing valuations in the buyout context, see Golz, Valuation and LBOs,
BUYOUTS & AcQUISITIONS, Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 41.
157. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. These conflicts of interest should include
fees contingent on the success of the buyout, equity participation in the buyout group, and place-
ment or underwriting of debt to finance the buyout. Evidence that management had promised to
direct unrelated future business to the investment banking firm if the opinion conformed to man-
agement's specifications would also constitute a basis for finding that the fairness opinion was
tainted by a conflict of interest. Cf. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712 (stating that disclosure of circum-
stances leading to rendering of investment bank's opinion is relevant in determining fairness of
price).
158. In the absence of information revealed through pre-trial discovery that expressly con-
flicts with the analysis of the investment advisors' fairness opinion, the standard would be one of
negligence-that is, reasonable diligence and use of a methodology recognized as proper for valuing
a company in a given industry by other members of the investment banking or appraisal commu-
nity. See Hanson Trust PLC, 781 F.2d at 275, 278 (describing case in which methodology em-
ployed for valuing a business recognized as improper by other investment banking firms); Joseph
v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 344 (Del. Ch. 1984) (citing questionable methodology employed in
rendering valuation). Likewise, investment bankers must have some responsibility for determining
1988] MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS
supplement the contractual obligation) recognizes a higher primary
duty of the investment advisors to the corporation and allows for the
application to advisors of established doctrines of duty of loyalty, duty
of care, and waiver of liability. Damages for a breach of an investment
advisor's fiduciary duty should be equal to the shareholders' loss attrib-
utable to the negligently rendered fairness opinion, limited, perhaps, by
a percentage of the total firm value. 159 Moreover, the rendering of a
defective fairness opinion should provide grounds for appropriate in-
junctive relief. Suit can be brought by the board or by the shareholders
in a classic shareholder derivative suit-simultaneously providing
shareholders with a monitoring mechanism while still retaining an es-
tablished means for separating strike suits from legitimate claims of
shareholders on behalf of the corporation.'
Consistent with recent developments in officer and director liabil-
ity, waiver or indemnification of liability provisions 16 should be appli-
cable to the board's purchase of the fairness opinion, but only under
tightly controlled circumstances. First, the board of directors cannot
agree in contracts with the advisors to waive the advisor's duty of loy-
the reasonableness and accuracy of the data upon which the fairness opinion is based.
159. The effect that this liability standard would have upon the investment banking fees
necessary to procure a fairness opinion is uncertain. Investment bankers are aware of the increas-
ing importance of fairness opinions and have seen the amount of litigation surrounding all other
aspects of merger and acquisition activity increase. A rational response to these changing condi-
tions would seem to dictate that fairness opinions be priced with respect to both the costs of
gathering and analyzing information, as well as the risk of litigation. A formal standard for liabil-
ity, or at least a more enforceable standard, would probably increase the risk premium incorpo-
rated into the price of the fairness opinion. In any event, relative to the total fees involved in
structuring and financing a large management buyout, the price of obtaining a fairness opinion will
remain small.
160. Some commentators have suggested that a fiduciary duty be created running from the
investment bankers rendering the fairness opinion directly to the corporation's shareholders. See,
e.g., Fairness Opinions, supra note 31, at 121 nn.11 & 13. This would apparently allow any indi-
vidual shareholder to sue if they believed the fairness opinion to be defective. We believe that the
balance struck between the strike suits that the establishment of this fiduciary duty would trigger
and the greater monitoring that might be available through more broad based shareholder moni-
toring of buyouts cuts in favor of using the traditional derivative suit procedures to screen share-
holders' claims for relief. Litigation already is rampant in the area of management buyouts.
Increased independence and power for shareholders' negotiating agents on a special committee,
coupled with the possibility of shareholder derivative suits, should be sufficient to police ade-
quately the merits of fairness opinions. See Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as
Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 745 (1984) (the derivative ac-
tion is a cost-effective means of deterring opportunistic behavior by agents, most significantly non-
recurring "one shot" breaches of fiduciary duty).
161. The traditional approach was to separate indemnification and waiver issues, but com-
mentators now recognize that these approaches to limiting or shifting liability costs can be
equivalents. See generally Oesterle, Limits on a Corporation's Protection of its Directors and
Officers from Personal Liability, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 513.
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alty16 2 or to indemnify advisors for breaches of their duty of loyalty.
Second, consistent with the modern view that a firm can waive a direc-
tor's duty of care or indemnify a director for breaches of such duty,"'3 a
firm should be able to waive or indemnify advisor breaches of the duty
of care under select conditions. Shareholders themselves can assent to
waiver or indemnification."' The assent of the shareholders should be
obtained for a specific transaction and not as a preliminary matter to
all negotiations-that is, the board should not be able to seek a vote on
a general waiver of liability for any and all future transactions that
might affect corporate control. Absent a shareholder vote, only a "spe-
cial negotiating committee" composed of disinterested directors 1" be
able to execute waivers or indemnification agreements on the firm's be-
half. Whenever the committee executes a waiver it should do so only on
a specific finding that members of the committee have sufficient exper-
tise and access to information to monitor the investment bank's render-
ing of the fairness opinion. 6 Whenever an advisor is rendering a
fairness opinion under a waiver or indemnification of duty of care liabil-
ity, specific and conspicuous disclosure of the waiver should still be
presented to shareholders in the materials soliciting the tender of their
shares to the buyout group.
162. REVISED MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1984).
163. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 7.17, Limitation on Damages for Certain Violations of the Duty of Care 29-42 (Tent. Draft No. 7,
Apr. 10, 1987); see also Pease, Outside Directors: Their Importance to the Corporation and Pro-
tection From Liability, 12 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 25 (1987).
164. If shareholders are to assent to a transaction with inherent conflicts of interest, such as
a management buyout, a similar standard should govern approval of waiver or indemnification
provisions associated with an instrumental part of the transaction such as obtaining a fairness
opinion. The percentage of shareholder votes required for approval of such provisions would in fact
determine the usefulness of the waiver or indemnification alternative. A good rule of thumb might
be to require the same degree of shareholder assent as is required for approving director conflicts
of interest. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act establishes the approval level for director
conflicts of interest as a simple majority of shares entitled to vote. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT § 8.31(d) (1984).
165. For purposes of this proposal, we differentiate between an "independent negotiating
committee" and a "special negotiating committee." The "independent committee" is composed
simply of outside directors. The "special committee" we propose, see infra notes 177-81 and ac-
companying text, recommends adding additional shareholder-elected representatives to the tradi-
tional independent negotiating committee. The following discussion concerning the requisite
disclosure and use of fairness opinions by a management buyout group, however, is generally appli-
cable to buyouts carried out with or without either type of negotiating committee.
166. A disinterested board still might be liable for making negligent findings if it failed to
exercise an informed business judgment.
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B. Strengthening the Independent Negotiating Committee Versus
Requiring More Disclosure by the Buyout Group
Two further recommendations to achieve fairness in management
buyouts depend on the existence of a specially formed negotiating com-
mittee. First, absent the formation of a special negotiating committee,
managers have an obligation to disclose to their shareholders the
buyout group's final price evaluations 67 and their future plans for the
firm. Second, managers have an obligation to dismantle all structural
barriers to third party bidders-lock-ups, poison pills and the
like-unless they are erected by a special negotiating committee. The
managers' full disclosure obligation-in essence they must reveal their
reservation price"6'-stems from their dual role as personally interested
management buyout participants and as shareholder fiduciaries, and
the supremacy of their fiduciary obligations. If managers want negotiat-
ing room, that is, if they want to be able to conceal and improve their
bottom line position, managers must completely delegate their role as
fiduciaries. Thus, if a special negotiating committee is established, then
the purchasing managers do not have to release their final price evalua-
tions or their plans for the firm once they have bought it, as long as the
negotiating committee has all the material information relevant to a
valuation other than the buyout group's plans for the firm.'69
167. While this might appear to discourage auction contests, the phenomena of a manage-
ment buyout group continually increasing its bid in the face of competition for control by a third-
party indicates that management's initial bid was less than that which might have been offered to
shareholders if all available relevant information were disclosed. In any event, we would allow for
an increase in the management buyout group's bid over any initial offer if a special negotiating
committee were first established. The purpose of the rigid bidding position to be established for
management buyout groups is, after all, simply a means of stimulating the formation of truly inde-
pendent committees to negotiate on the shareholders' behalf prior to any buyout offer. The estab-
lishment of such a committee would then entitle management to withhold their plans for the firm's
future and to reap any gains that might accrue from the implementation of superior management
strategies.
168. There clearly is no such obligation under current state laws, even in the case of a major-
ity shareholder cashing out the minority shareholders. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d
929, 939 (Del. 1985); cf. Herzel & Coling I, supra note 107, at 1533-34. It is as yet unclear what
standard will be used to scrutinize disclosures under the federal securities laws that call for inclu-
sion of an opinion as to fairness and disclosures of appraisals and reports pertaining to valuation.
See Schedule 13E-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1987).
169. If those plans should have been undertaken when the firm was publicly owned, the
shareholders should have an after-the-fact remedy in a lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duty. Since
these plans will inevitably become clear after the buyout, there is no need to disclose them on the
eve of the buyout.
This Article's proposal envisions a role for committee members that apparently is greater than
that currently played by many outside directors. See generally Manning, The Business Judgment
Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477 (1984). Accord-
ingly, a system of compensation designed both to stimulate committee members to maintain a
watchful eye over the firm and to ensure that committee members retain their independence would
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The proposal has as one of its primary purposes the elimination of
generic fairness opinions that exclude any evaluation of the particular
situation of the buyout group. If there is no special committee, the
buyout group must disclose its bottom line; it cannot hide behind a ge-
neric fairness opinion which claims that a substantially lower price is
fair. If a special committee is established, on the other hand, there is no
need for mandatory disclosure rules that require the buyout group to
reveal its full negotiation range. The special committee can protect the
shareholders' interests by soliciting independent fairness opinions from
unbiased advisors. But the fairness opinion written for the committee
by investment advisors financially unconnected to the buyout group
should include an evaluation of the buyout group's negotiating posture,
including inferences about the group's reservation price, based on
whatever evidence about the buyout group is available. Although the
buyout group is entitled to shield their individual reservation price, the
special committee, and their advisors, have a duty to the shareholders
to make recommendations that take into consideration estimates of the
buyout group's particular negotiating situation.170 It is nonsense for the
committee's investment advisors to hide, as they currently do, behind
general market evaluations of price when a specific buyer or buyers are
in the picture and more specific evaluations of the buyers' plans for the
firm are available.
The special negotiating committee should encourage third-party
bidders in most cases, maintaining structural blocking devices only to
need to be devised. Possible committee members who would already have an interest in the firm's
affairs and yet might be suitably independent would include institutional investors, securities ana-
lysts, and business or economics academics.
170. While some might assert that any price paid to shareholders that includes a substantial
premium over market price is "fair," we believe this unduly shortchanges the negotiating position
of shareholders. If you are selling your car and locate a would-be buyer offering to pay a price at a
premium over "fair market value" and subsequently learn that this potential buyer may be willing
to pay even more than his initial offer because the car was once owned by his father, you are not
likely to accept his initial offer simply because the price exceeds a "market value." Likewise, if
shareholders believe that managers' premium-priced offer is at the low end of the range of prices
management would be willing to pay for the corporation, shareholders should have a negotiating
mechanism that allows them to try and obtain a price closer to the top of the range. Simply stated,
"fair value" is dependent on the particular negotiating posture of the parties, not on whether the
offering price is at a premium over market price.
Apart from a misunderstanding of what shareholders "should be happy with," a rule that
disables shareholders from claiming full value for their shares has serious costs. The heaviest cost
will come from the shareholders' own efforts to extract full value, using whatever techniques they
can, to avoid the rules (the equivalent of the creation of a gray market in a time of price control on
retail goods). Shareholders will spend up to the lost value of their property in order to extract full
value for their shares. This is a heavy social cost. For example, target shareholders that are prohib-
ited from holding out for higher offers from bidders in tender offers will erect pre-bid defenses that
divert bidders away from tender offers into other forms of negotiated mergers. See Oesterle I,
supra note 11, at 126 n.43.
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stimulate further bidding. Thus, structural blocking devices are not per
se illegal, unless they are used to favor one bidder over another without
significant increases in the favored offeror's bid.171 Even blocking activ-
ity that is used to favor one bidder over another is not illegal when the
activity is used to stimulate an increased bid by an auction participant
when such a bid would not otherwise be forthcoming and when suitable
consideration in the form of an increased bid is given for the advantage
afforded the bidder.172
This framework is designed to balance bid incentives with the
shareholders' right to the benefits of management's inside information.
Current state law governing the negotiating process in management
buyouts, when combined with the federal securities law disclosure sys-
tem applicable to transactions under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Rules 13e-3 173 and 14d-1, 174 is inadequate because the information
disclosed for the benefit of shareholders does not seem to be used in
negotiating their payment in the buyout. 75 If the required SEC disclo-
sures were effective in conveying to shareholders the values manage-
ment hopes to produce from a buyout, shareholders would not leave
large piles of money laying on the negotiating table-as they indeed
appear to have done.176 If the disclosure made in a management buyout
is to be truly useful to shareholders, negotiating representatives who
can and will use this information are needed. This fact points to the
creation of special negotiating committees that are not merely com-
posed of outside directors, but also include specially elected shareholder
representatives. Unless shareholders' perceptions that they are being
victimized by buyouts are changed through the establishment of a cred-
ible negotiating process, management buyouts may be legislated into
171. The quality of financing may be a grounds for favoring one bidder, although a better
solution may be to inform the shareholders of the differences in financing and allow shareholders
to make the ultimate decision at the tender offer stage.
172. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. The value of blocking behavior in stimulat-
ing further bids is vastly overrated and may itself create opportunities for strategic behavior by
bidders. See Oesterle I, supra note 11, at 152.
173. Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1987).
174. Rule 14d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1.
175. Indeed, in many of the most controversial transactions, it appears that the outside di-
rectors read very few documents let alone securities filings. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp.,
798 F.2d 802, 886 (6th Cir. 1986); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisitions, Inc., 781 F.2d 264,
270-71 (2d Cir. 1986); cf. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See generally Manning,
supra note 169. Perhaps courts should investigate, in their evaluation of the role of outside direc-
tors in approving a management buyout, whether the outside directors have any familiarity with
the SEC disclosures relevant to the transaction. If the answer is no, either courts must continue to
scrutinize closely such transactions or the SEC should rethink the disclosure system governing
buyouts.
176. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (discussing the phenomenal profitability
of many recent management buyouts).
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obscurity. Both shareholders at large and the would-be owners of the
public companies that would otherwise be taken private would suffer as
a result.
Ultimately, whether a special negotiating committee will function
properly will depend on how it is structured and compensated. Since
several specific structural alternatives and compensation systems may
be workable, the following is a possible combination. A special negotiat-
ing committee could include members other than outside directors who
are initially appointed with the approval of the firm's chief executive
officer. 177 The committee could consist of specially elected representa-
tives, nominated by a committee of shareholders and elected by share-
holders, who have no function other than to act in the event of major
changes in corporate control. The optimal committee would consist pri-
marily of members who owe no allegiance to the existing management
team and who understand their role to be one solely of maximizing the
value of stock prices in the event of a change in control.' The commit-
tee's ultimate compensation could depend upon a bonus system tied to
the premium over market price that they negotiated for shareholders.'79
Such a special negotiating committee would be encouraged to hire
separate investment advisors, and legal counsel if necessary, to act
177. Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
viewed the problem as follows:
When managers are busy erecting obstacles to the taking over of the corporation by an inves-
tor who is likely to fire them if the takeover attempt succeeds, they have a clear conflict of
interest, and it is not cured by vesting the power of decision in a board of directors in which
insiders are a minority.. . . No one likes to be fired, whether he is just a director or also an
officer. The so-called outsiders moreover are often friends of the insiders. And since they
spend only part of their time on the affairs of the corporation, their knowledge of those affairs
is much less than that of the insiders, to whom they are likely therefore to defer.
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds,
107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
178. The benefits of well-formulated special negotiating committees have been vividly
demonstrated in several recent transactions. See, e.g., Becor Western Gets Rival Bid by Lynch
Corp., Wall St. J., June 3, 1987, at 22, col. 2 (competing management buyout transaction proposed
after rival bidder approached by outside directors and their independent financial advisors); BP
Increases Bid For Standard Oil By $450 Million, Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 1987, at 2, col. 2 (noting that
a special committee of British Petroleum's board hired independent financial advisors and negoti-
ated price of $7.9 billion in cash-out merger); see also Purolator Board Member Quits to Solicit
Bids, Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1987, at 9, col. 1; How to Avoid Conflicts of Interest in the Takeover
Game, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1987, at 18, col. 3; Owens-Illinois, in About-Face, Will Meet with
Kohlberg and Any Other Suitors, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1987, at 8, col. 2; Owens-Illinois Officers,
Outside Directors Said to Be Split Over Kohlberg Kravis Bid, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1987, at 7, col.
1. This proposal is intended to bring these types of benefits to all transactions by formalizing the
negotiating relationship between corporate management, outside directors, and shareholders in
management buyouts and other control transactions that may be tainted by possibly abusive self-
dealing.
179. See Oesterle II, supra note 11, at 67 (suggesting appointment by target shareholders of
a special agent to negotiate with outside bidders in tender offer situations).
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solely on behalf of the shareholders. 180 Formation of a properly func-
tioning committee, and the committee's subsequent approval of a trans-
action, would entitle the board of directors approving the bid to the full
protections of the business judgment rule. 18'
V. CONCLUSION
The increased frequency and size of management buyout transac-
tions have given them new significance as a means of transferring cor-
porate control. Along with this increased prominence, however, has
come a greater awareness of the conflicts of interest that buyouts create
for the management participants and their investment advisors. The
problems have been highlighted in transactions in which management
and other buyout participants have made millions of dollars on small
investments during short periods of time. Shareholders naturally are
led to believe they may have been shortchanged when they sold the
company to their former fiduciaries.
This Article has proposed procedural changes in the execution of
180. The objective of this proposal is not to add another group of investment bankers to the
parade through the witness stand in the event of litigation, but to make sure that there is a quali-
fied party available to committee members-whether they be truly "independent" or merely
outside directors-to evaluate the financial merits of management's proposals. See Friedman,
Gordon & Brown, Representing the Public Company in a Going-Private Transaction, in GOING
PRIVATE 1984, 453 CORP. L. & PRAC. HANDBOOK 105, 108-110 (PLI 1984). Most outside directors
that have been found by the courts to have breached their duty of care were probably not acting in
bad faith, but rather did not appreciate the gravity of the decision they were employed to make,
were not given information, did not understand the information given to them, or simply did not
have the time to carry out properly their responsibilities to target shareholders given other obliga-
tions to their full-time employers. See Manning, supra note 169. Creating strong incentives for the
formation of a truly independent committee and for the subsequent retention of a second group of
investment advisors will provide shareholders with at least a minimum required negotiating
strength that may alleviate many of the problems that have come to the fore in recent cases.
181. The implementation of the business judgment rule into the analysis of transactions that
raise the potential for self-dealing is now a function of establishing the board of directors' "good
faith and reasonable investigation" prior to approval of antitakeover measures or control transac-
tions. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986) (conclud-
ing that implementation of antitakeover measures creates potential conflict of interest which calls
for preliminary test before business judgment rule will protect directors); Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (noting that when there is a potential conflict of inter-
est, initial burden will lie with directors); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955
(Del. 1985) (noting that possible self-dealing creates an enhanced duty on part of directors that
requires threshold test of "good faith and reasonable investigation" before protection of the busi-
ness judgment rule is granted); see also Hanson Trust PLC, 781 F.2d at 273. This is a preliminary
burden of proof that has been attached to corporate transactions with potential for abusive self-
dealing that, when met, will leave the plaintiffs to establish their case in chief. This preliminary
burden currently can be met by the board through a showing that the transaction was approved by
a board consisting of a majority of "disinterested outside directors" or through the establishment
of a special negotiating committee to act exclusively on behalf of the public shareholders. Id. at
274.
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management buyouts to help assure shareholders' interests are repre-
sented adequately when a buyout is proposed and to provide more use-
ful valuation information to shareholders' negotiating representatives.
These changes will increase the strength of shareholders' negotiating
position vis-a-vis the management buyout group. Providing a more for-
mal process for buyouts with better representation for shareholders not
only will allow shareholders to continue to realize the benefits of
buyouts, but also will increase the accountability of investment advisors
and management buyout participants.
